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Eric Olsson 0001

dblp:301/5809 · also Lars Eric Olsson · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0002-0465-2925ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Web and mobile security · 43% Cyber-physical and IoT security · 28% Systems and software security · 28%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Software testing · 100%
Computer networks
1 paper
Internet of things and sensor networks · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and mobile security › web security
cross-site scripting
0.812024
Spider-Scents: Grey-box Database-aware Web Scanning for Stored XSS · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Systems and software security › isolation
javascript sandbox
0.512021
SandTrap: Securing JavaScript-driven Trigger-Action Platforms · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Cyber-physical and IoT security › smart home security
trigger-action platform security
0.512021
SandTrap: Securing JavaScript-driven Trigger-Action Platforms · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Internet of things and sensor networks
smart home
0.112021
SandTrap: Securing JavaScript-driven Trigger-Action Platforms · USENIX Security Symposium 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

input validation · 1.5grey-box scanning · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 FakeX: A Framework for Detecting Fake Reviews of Browser Extensions
abstract
Browser extensions boost user experience on the web. Similarly to smartphone app stores, browsers like Chrome distribute browser extensions via their Web Store, enabling a thriving market of third-party developed extensions. The Web Store incorporates a user review system to help users decide which extensions to install. Unfortunately, the open nature of the review system is subject to reputation manipulation. As browser vendors fight reputation manipulation, attackers employ more sophisticated methods to stay under the radar. Focusing on fake reviews, we identify several techniques attackers use: fake accounts, disjoint sets of fake accounts for different extensions, automation of generated reviews, and focusing on reviews rather than ratings. We present FakeX, a framework to detect fake reviews by focusing on inference from review metadata. FakeX employs five distinct methods, including temporal distribution analysis, relationship clustering, and ratio-based assessments, to unveil patterns indicative of fake reviews. Evaluation of over 1.7 million reviews reveals the effectiveness of FakeX in identifying hundreds of fake review campaigns. Furthermore, our investigation of these fake reviews uncovers 86 malicious extensions, mounting attacks that range from data-stealing to monetization, impacting over 64 million users. In addition, we collaborate with Adblock Plus and Avast to demonstrate FakeX in action, expanding a seed list of newly detected malicious extensions to discover a further 16 malicious extensions with millions of users, where, in some cases, attackers tried to improve malicious code.
Eric Olsson 0001, Benjamin Eriksson, Pablo Picazo-Sanchez, Lukas Andersson, Andrei Sabelfeld
AsiaCCS1
2024 Spider-Scents: Grey-box Database-aware Web Scanning for Stored XSS
Eric Olsson 0001, Benjamin Eriksson, Adam Doupé, Andrei Sabelfeld
USENIX Security Symposium1
2021 SandTrap: Securing JavaScript-driven Trigger-Action Platforms
Mohammad M. Ahmadpanah, Daniel Hedin, Musard Balliu, Eric Olsson 0001, Andrei Sabelfeld
USENIX Security Symposium4