Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Maynard Koch

dblp:303/4577 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0009-3698-1342ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 100%
Computer networks
2 papers
Internet architecture and protocols · 84% Network measurement and analytics · 16%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security › attack strategy › denial-of-service attack
DDoS attack
0.912025
Forward to Hell? On the Potentials of Misusing Transparent DNS Forwarders in Reflective Amplification Attacks · CCS 2025
Network security › attack strategy › denial-of-service attack
DNS amplification attack
0.912025
Forward to Hell? On the Potentials of Misusing Transparent DNS Forwarders in Reflective Amplification Attacks · CCS 2025
Network security › protocol security
DNS security
0.912025
Forward to Hell? On the Potentials of Misusing Transparent DNS Forwarders in Reflective Amplification Attacks · CCS 2025
Internet architecture and protocols › domain name system
DNS infrastructure
0.512021
Transparent forwarders: an unnoticed component of the open DNS infrastructure · CoNEXT 2021
Internet architecture and protocols
domain name system
0.312025
Forward to Hell? On the Potentials of Misusing Transparent DNS Forwarders in Reflective Amplification Attacks · CCS 2025
Network measurement and analytics › internet measurement
DNS measurement
0.112021
Transparent forwarders: an unnoticed component of the open DNS infrastructure · CoNEXT 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

empirical measurement · 1.7traceroute · 0.5scanning · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Forward to Hell? On the Potentials of Misusing Transparent DNS Forwarders in Reflective Amplification Attacks
abstract
The DNS infrastructure is infamous for facilitating reflective amplification attacks. Various countermeasures such as server shielding, access control, rate limiting, and protocol restrictions have been implemented. Still, the threat remains throughout the deployment of DNS servers. In this paper, we report on and evaluate the often unnoticed threat that derives from transparent DNS forwarders, a widely deployed, incompletely functional set of DNS components. Transparent DNS forwarders transfer DNS requests without rebuilding packets with correct source addresses. As such, transparent forwarders feed DNS requests into (mainly powerful and anycasted) open recursive resolvers, which thereby can be misused to participate unwillingly in distributed reflective amplification attacks. We show how transparent forwarders raise severe threats to the Internet infrastructure. They easily circumvent rate limiting and achieve an additional, scalable impact via the DNS anycast infrastructure. We empirically verify this scaling behavior up to a factor of 14. Transparent forwarders can also assist in bypassing firewall rules that protect recursive resolvers, making these shielded infrastructure entities part of the global DNS attack surface.
Maynard Koch, Florian Dolzmann, Thomas C. Schmidt, Matthias Wählisch
CCS1
2021 Transparent forwarders: an unnoticed component of the open DNS infrastructure
abstract
In this paper, we revisit the open DNS (ODNS) infrastructure and, for the first time, systematically measure and analyze transparent forwarders, DNS components that transparently relay between stub resolvers and recursive resolvers. Our key findings include four takeaways. First, transparent forwarders contribute 26% (563k) to the current ODNS infrastructure. Unfortunately, common periodic scanning campaigns such as Shadowserver do not capture transparent forwarders and thus underestimate the current threat potential of the ODNS. Second, we find an increased deployment of transparent forwarders in Asia and South America. In India alone, the ODNS consists of 80% transparent forwarders. Third, many transparent forwarders relay to a few selected public resolvers such as Google and Cloudflare, which confirms a consolidation trend of DNS stakeholders. Finally, we introduce DNSRoute++, a new traceroute approach to understand the network infrastructure connecting transparent forwarders and resolvers.
Marcin Nawrocki, Maynard Koch, Thomas C. Schmidt, Matthias Wählisch
CoNEXT2