Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Maynard Koch
dblp:303/4577
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0009-3698-1342ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Network security · 100% | |
| Computer networks
2 papers |
Internet architecture and protocols · 84% Network measurement and analytics · 16% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network security › attack strategy › denial-of-service attack
DDoS attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Forward to Hell? On the Potentials of Misusing Transparent DNS Forwarders in Reflective Amplification Attacks · CCS 2025 |
Network security › attack strategy › denial-of-service attack
DNS amplification attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Forward to Hell? On the Potentials of Misusing Transparent DNS Forwarders in Reflective Amplification Attacks · CCS 2025 |
Network security › protocol security
DNS security |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Forward to Hell? On the Potentials of Misusing Transparent DNS Forwarders in Reflective Amplification Attacks · CCS 2025 |
Internet architecture and protocols › domain name system
DNS infrastructure |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Transparent forwarders: an unnoticed component of the open DNS infrastructure · CoNEXT 2021 |
Internet architecture and protocols
domain name system |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Forward to Hell? On the Potentials of Misusing Transparent DNS Forwarders in Reflective Amplification Attacks · CCS 2025 |
Network measurement and analytics › internet measurement
DNS measurement |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | Transparent forwarders: an unnoticed component of the open DNS infrastructure · CoNEXT 2021 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
empirical measurement · 1.7traceroute · 0.5scanning · 0.5
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Forward to Hell? On the Potentials of Misusing Transparent DNS Forwarders in Reflective Amplification AttacksabstractThe DNS infrastructure is infamous for facilitating reflective amplification attacks. Various countermeasures such as server shielding, access control, rate limiting, and protocol restrictions have been implemented. Still, the threat remains throughout the deployment of DNS servers. In this paper, we report on and evaluate the often unnoticed threat that derives from transparent DNS forwarders, a widely deployed, incompletely functional set of DNS components. Transparent DNS forwarders transfer DNS requests without rebuilding packets with correct source addresses. As such, transparent forwarders feed DNS requests into (mainly powerful and anycasted) open recursive resolvers, which thereby can be misused to participate unwillingly in distributed reflective amplification attacks. We show how transparent forwarders raise severe threats to the Internet infrastructure. They easily circumvent rate limiting and achieve an additional, scalable impact via the DNS anycast infrastructure. We empirically verify this scaling behavior up to a factor of 14. Transparent forwarders can also assist in bypassing firewall rules that protect recursive resolvers, making these shielded infrastructure entities part of the global DNS attack surface. Maynard Koch, Florian Dolzmann, Thomas C. Schmidt, Matthias Wählisch |
CCS | 1 |
| 2021 | Transparent forwarders: an unnoticed component of the open DNS infrastructureabstractIn this paper, we revisit the open DNS (ODNS) infrastructure and, for the first time, systematically measure and analyze transparent forwarders, DNS components that transparently relay between stub resolvers and recursive resolvers. Our key findings include four takeaways. First, transparent forwarders contribute 26% (563k) to the current ODNS infrastructure. Unfortunately, common periodic scanning campaigns such as Shadowserver do not capture transparent forwarders and thus underestimate the current threat potential of the ODNS. Second, we find an increased deployment of transparent forwarders in Asia and South America. In India alone, the ODNS consists of 80% transparent forwarders. Third, many transparent forwarders relay to a few selected public resolvers such as Google and Cloudflare, which confirms a consolidation trend of DNS stakeholders. Finally, we introduce DNSRoute++, a new traceroute approach to understand the network infrastructure connecting transparent forwarders and resolvers. Marcin Nawrocki, Maynard Koch, Thomas C. Schmidt, Matthias Wählisch |
CoNEXT | 2 |