Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Sebastian H. Faller
dblp:303/4711
· DBLP profile ↗
6ranked-venue papers
3as first author
6since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0005-4126-3098ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 6 · 3 first-author · 6 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
5 papers |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 88% Hardware security and side channels · 6% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 4% |
Topics — the 9 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
oblivious pseudorandom function |
1.9 | 2 | 2026 | Combining Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions · EUROCRYPT (2) 2026 The 2Hash OPRF Framework and Efficient Post-quantum Instantiations · EUROCRYPT (8) 2025 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key exchange › authenticated key exchange
password-authenticated key exchange |
1.4 | 2 | 2024 | Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM Protection · CCS 2024 Generalized Fuzzy Password-Authenticated Key Exchange from Error Correcting Codes · ASIACRYPT (8) 2023 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
oblivious transfer |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Combining Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions · EUROCRYPT (2) 2026 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › oblivious pseudorandom function
post-quantum OPRF |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | The 2Hash OPRF Framework and Efficient Post-quantum Instantiations · EUROCRYPT (8) 2025 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
key management |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM Protection · CCS 2024 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
post-quantum cryptography |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | The 2Hash OPRF Framework and Efficient Post-quantum Instantiations · EUROCRYPT (8) 2025 |
Hardware security and side channels › cryptographic hardware
hardware security module |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM Protection · CCS 2024 |
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM Protection · CCS 2024 |
Web and mobile security
messaging application security |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | Security Analysis of the WhatsApp End-to-End Encrypted Backup Protocol · CRYPTO (4) 2023 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
OPAQUE protocol · 0.8error-correcting codes · 0.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Combining Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions
Sebastian H. Faller, Marc Fischlin, Julius Hardt, Julia Hesse |
EUROCRYPT (2) | 1 |
| 2025 | The 2Hash OPRF Framework and Efficient Post-quantum Instantiations
Ward Beullens, Lucas Dodgson, Sebastian H. Faller, Julia Hesse |
EUROCRYPT (8) | 3 |
| 2024 | Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM ProtectionabstractPassword-protected key retrieval (PPKR) enables users to store and retrieve high-entropy keys from a server securely. The process is bootstrapped from a human-memorizable password only, addressing the challenge of how end-users can manage cryptographic key material. The core security requirement is protection against a corrupt server, which should not be able to learn the key or offline- attack it through the password protection. PPKR is deployed at a large scale with the WhatsApp Backup Protocol (WBP), allowing users to access their encrypted messaging history when switching to a new device. Davies et al. (Crypto'23) formally analyzed the WBP, proving that it satisfies most of the desired security. The WBP uses the OPAQUE protocol for password-based key exchange as a building block and relies on the server using a hardware security module (HSM) for most of its protection. In fact, the security analysis assumes that the HSM is incorruptible - rendering most of the heavy cryptography in the WBP obsolete. Sebastian H. Faller, Tobias Handirk, Julia Hesse, Máté Horváth, Anja Lehmann |
CCS | 1 |
| 2023 | Generalized Fuzzy Password-Authenticated Key Exchange from Error Correcting Codes
Jonathan Bootle, Sebastian H. Faller, Julia Hesse, Kristina Hostáková, Johannes Ottenhues |
ASIACRYPT (8) | 2 |
| 2023 | Security Analysis of the WhatsApp End-to-End Encrypted Backup Protocol
Gareth T. Davies, Sebastian H. Faller, Kai Gellert, Tobias Handirk, Julia Hesse, Máté Horváth, Tibor Jager |
CRYPTO (4) | 2 |
| 2021 | Black-Box Accumulation Based on Lattices
Sebastian H. Faller, Pascal Baumer, Michael Klooß, Alexander Koch 0001, Astrid Ottenhues, Markus Raiber |
IMACC | 1 |