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Sebastian H. Faller

dblp:303/4711 · DBLP profile ↗
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6ranked-venue papers
3as first author
6since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0005-4126-3098ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 6 · 3 first-author · 6 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
5 papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 88% Hardware security and side channels · 6% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 4%

Topics — the 9 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
oblivious pseudorandom function
1.922026
Combining Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions · EUROCRYPT (2) 2026
The 2Hash OPRF Framework and Efficient Post-quantum Instantiations · EUROCRYPT (8) 2025
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key exchange › authenticated key exchange
password-authenticated key exchange
1.422024
Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM Protection · CCS 2024
Generalized Fuzzy Password-Authenticated Key Exchange from Error Correcting Codes · ASIACRYPT (8) 2023
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
oblivious transfer
1.012026
Combining Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions · EUROCRYPT (2) 2026
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › oblivious pseudorandom function
post-quantum OPRF
0.912025
The 2Hash OPRF Framework and Efficient Post-quantum Instantiations · EUROCRYPT (8) 2025
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
key management
0.812024
Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM Protection · CCS 2024
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
post-quantum cryptography
0.312025
The 2Hash OPRF Framework and Efficient Post-quantum Instantiations · EUROCRYPT (8) 2025
Hardware security and side channels › cryptographic hardware
hardware security module
0.212024
Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM Protection · CCS 2024
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
0.212024
Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM Protection · CCS 2024
Web and mobile security
messaging application security
0.212023
Security Analysis of the WhatsApp End-to-End Encrypted Backup Protocol · CRYPTO (4) 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

OPAQUE protocol · 0.8error-correcting codes · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Combining Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions
Sebastian H. Faller, Marc Fischlin, Julius Hardt, Julia Hesse
EUROCRYPT (2)1
2025 The 2Hash OPRF Framework and Efficient Post-quantum Instantiations
Ward Beullens, Lucas Dodgson, Sebastian H. Faller, Julia Hesse
EUROCRYPT (8)3
2024 Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM Protection
abstract
Password-protected key retrieval (PPKR) enables users to store and retrieve high-entropy keys from a server securely. The process is bootstrapped from a human-memorizable password only, addressing the challenge of how end-users can manage cryptographic key material. The core security requirement is protection against a corrupt server, which should not be able to learn the key or offline- attack it through the password protection. PPKR is deployed at a large scale with the WhatsApp Backup Protocol (WBP), allowing users to access their encrypted messaging history when switching to a new device. Davies et al. (Crypto'23) formally analyzed the WBP, proving that it satisfies most of the desired security. The WBP uses the OPAQUE protocol for password-based key exchange as a building block and relies on the server using a hardware security module (HSM) for most of its protection. In fact, the security analysis assumes that the HSM is incorruptible - rendering most of the heavy cryptography in the WBP obsolete.
Sebastian H. Faller, Tobias Handirk, Julia Hesse, Máté Horváth, Anja Lehmann
CCS1
2023 Generalized Fuzzy Password-Authenticated Key Exchange from Error Correcting Codes
Jonathan Bootle, Sebastian H. Faller, Julia Hesse, Kristina Hostáková, Johannes Ottenhues
ASIACRYPT (8)2
2023 Security Analysis of the WhatsApp End-to-End Encrypted Backup Protocol
Gareth T. Davies, Sebastian H. Faller, Kai Gellert, Tobias Handirk, Julia Hesse, Máté Horváth, Tibor Jager
CRYPTO (4)2
2021 Black-Box Accumulation Based on Lattices
Sebastian H. Faller, Pascal Baumer, Michael Klooß, Alexander Koch 0001, Astrid Ottenhues, Markus Raiber
IMACC1