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Manuel L. Correia

dblp:303/4715 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems › zero-knowledge proofs
MPC-in-the-head
0.512021
Machine-checked ZKP for NP relations: Formally Verified Security Proofs and Implementations of MPC-in-the-Head · CCS 2021
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure multiparty computation
0.512021
Machine-checked ZKP for NP relations: Formally Verified Security Proofs and Implementations of MPC-in-the-Head · CCS 2021
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems
zero-knowledge proofs
0.512021
Machine-checked ZKP for NP relations: Formally Verified Security Proofs and Implementations of MPC-in-the-Head · CCS 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

formal verification · 0.5MPC-in-the-head · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 Machine-checked ZKP for NP relations: Formally Verified Security Proofs and Implementations of MPC-in-the-Head
abstract
MPC-in-the-Head (MitH) is a general framework that enables constructing efficient zero-knowledge (ZK) protocols for NP relations from secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols. In this paper we present the first machine-checked implementations of MitH.
José Bacelar Almeida, Manuel Barbosa, Manuel L. Correia, Karim M. El Defrawy, Stéphane Lengrand, Hugo Pacheco 0001, Vitor Pereira 0002
CCS3