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Hannane Yaghoubizade

dblp:311/3644 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0003-0762-1398ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
fair division
1.012026
Fair Division Among Couples and Small Groups · AAAI 2026
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › fair division
group fairness
1.012026
Fair Division Among Couples and Small Groups · AAAI 2026
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › fair division
indivisible goods allocation
1.012026
Fair Division Among Couples and Small Groups · AAAI 2026
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Fair Division Among Couples and Small Groups
abstract
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods across groups of agents, where each agent fully enjoys all goods allocated to their group. We focus on groups of two (couples) and other groups of small size. For two couples, an EF1 allocation — one in which all agents find their group's bundle no worse than the other group's, up to one good — always exists and can be found efficiently. For three or more couples, EF1 allocations need not exist. Turning to proportionality, we show that, whenever groups have size at most k, a PROPk allocation exists and can be found efficiently. In fact, our algorithm additionally guarantees (fractional) Pareto optimality and PROP1 to the first agent in each group, PROP2 to the second, and so on, for an arbitrary agent ordering. In special cases, we show that there are PROP1 allocations for any number of couples.
Paul Gölz, Hannane Yaghoubizade
AAAI2
2025 On MAX-SAT with cardinality constraint
Fahad Panolan, Hannane Yaghoubizade
Theor. Comput. Sci.2