Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Andrew Weiler
dblp:32/5512
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Systems and software security · 62% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 38% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Systems and software security
memory safety |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Cryptographic Capability Computing · MICRO 2021 |
Processor architecture and microarchitecture
capability-based architecture |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Cryptographic Capability Computing · MICRO 2021 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › symmetric cryptography
lightweight cryptography |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | Cryptographic Capability Computing · MICRO 2021 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › block cipher
low-latency block cipher |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | Cryptographic Capability Computing · MICRO 2021 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
pointer encryption · 1.0lightweight cryptography · 1.0address translation prediction · 1.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Cryptographic Capability ComputingabstractCapability architectures for memory safety have traditionally required expanding pointers and radically changing microarchitectural structures throughout processors, while only providing superficial hardening. We hence propose Cryptographic Capability Computing (C3) - the first memory safety mechanism that is stateless to avoid requiring extra metadata storage. C3 retains 64-bit pointer sizes providing legacy binary compatibility while imposing minimal touchpoints. Pointers are encrypted to unforgeably (within cryptographic bounds) reference each object. Data is encrypted even in caches and entangled with pointers for both spatial and temporal object-granular protection. Pointers become like unique keys for each allocation. C3 deploys a novel form of prediction for address translation that mitigates performance overheads even when addresses are partially encrypted. Use of a low-latency, low-area cipher from the NIST Lightweight Cryptography project avoids delaying loads by readying a data keystream by the time data is returned from the L1 cache. C3 is compatible with legacy binaries. Simulated performance overhead on SPEC CPU2006 is negligible with no memory overhead, which is a big leap forward compared to the overheads imposed by past memory safety approaches. C3 effectively replaces inefficient metadata with efficient cryptography. Michael LeMay, Joydeep Rakshit, Sergej Deutsch, David Durham, Santosh Ghosh, Anant Nori, Jayesh Gaur, Andrew Weiler, Salmin Sultana, Karanvir Grewal, Sreenivas Subramoney |
MICRO | 8 |