The False Belief Test (FBT) has been the main method for assessing Theory of Mind (ToM) and related socio-cognitive competencies.For Large Language Models (LLMs), the reliability and explanatory potential of this test have remained limited due to issues like data contamination, insufficient model details, and inconsistent controls.We address these issues by testing 17 open-weight models on a balanced set of 192 FBT variants (Trott et al., 2023) using Bayesian Logistic regression to identify how model size and post-training affect socio-cognitive competence.We find that scaling model size benefits performance, but not strictly.A cross-over effect reveals that explicating propositional attitudes (X thinks) fundamentally alters response patterns.Instruction tuning partially mitigates this effect, but further reasoning-oriented finetuning amplifies it.In a case study analysing social reasoning ability throughout OLMo 2 training, we show that this cross-over effect emerges during pre-training, suggesting that models acquire stereotypical response patterns tied to mental-state vocabulary that can outweigh other scenario semantics.Finally, vector steering allows us to isolate a think vector as the causal driver of observed FBT behaviour.

Human languages have evolved to be structured through repeated language learning and use. These processes introduce biases that operate during language acquisition and shape linguistic systems toward communicative efficiency. In this paper, we investigate whether the same happens if artificial languages are optimised for implicit biases of Large Language Models (LLMs). To this end, we simulate a classical referential game in which LLMs learn and use artificial languages. Our results show that initially unstructured holistic languages are indeed shaped to have some structural properties that allow two LLM agents to communicate successfully. Similar to observations in human experiments, generational transmission increases the learnability of languages, but can at the same time result in non-humanlike degenerate vocabularies. Taken together, this work extends experimental findings, shows that LLMs can be used as tools in simulations of language evolution, and opens possibilities for future human-machine experiments in this field.

Languages are shaped by the inductive biases of their users. Using a classical referential game, we investigate how artificial languages evolve when optimised for inductive biases in humans and large language models (LLMs) via Human-Human, LLM-LLM and Human-LLM experiments. We show that referentially grounded vocabularies emerge that enable reliable communication in all conditions, even when humans and LLMs collaborate. Comparisons between conditions reveal that languages optimised for LLMs subtly differ from those optimised for humans. Interestingly, interactions between humans and LLMs alleviate these differences and result in vocabularies more human-like than LLM-like. These findings advance our understanding of the role inductive biases in LLMs play in the dynamic nature of human language and contribute to maintaining alignment in human and machine communication. In particular, our work underscores the need to think of new LLM training methods that include human interaction and shows that using communicative success as a reward signal can be a fruitful, novel direction.

Recent advances in multimodal models have raised questions about whether vision-and-language models (VLMs) integrate cross-modal information in ways that reflect human cognition. One well-studied test case in this domain is the bouba-kiki effect, where humans reliably associate pseudowords like ‘bouba’ with round shapes and ‘kiki’ with jagged ones. Given the mixed evidence found in prior studies for this effect in VLMs, we present a comprehensive re-evaluation focused on two variants of CLIP, ResNet and Vision Transformer (ViT), given their centrality in many state-of-the-art VLMs. We apply two complementary methods closely modelled after human experiments: a prompt-based evaluation that uses probabilities as a measure of model preference, and we use Grad-CAM as a novel approach to interpret visual attention in shape-word matching tasks. Our findings show that these model variants do not consistently exhibit the bouba-kiki effect. While ResNet shows a preference for round shapes, overall performance across both model variants lacks the expected associations. Moreover, direct comparison with prior human data on the same task shows that the models’ responses fall markedly short of the robust, modality-integrated behaviour characteristic of human cognition. These results contribute to the ongoing debate about the extent to which VLMs truly understand cross-modal concepts, highlighting limitations in their internal representations and alignment with human intuitions.

To what degree should we ascribe cognitive capacities to Large Language Models (LLMs), such as the ability to reason about intentions and beliefs known as Theory of Mind (ToM)? Here we add to this emerging debate by (i) testing 11 base- and instruction-tuned LLMs on capabilities relevant to ToM beyond the dominant false-belief paradigm, including non-literal language usage and recursive intentionality; (ii) using newly rewritten versions of standardized tests to gauge LLMs' robustness; (iii) prompting and scoring for open besides closed questions; and (iv) benchmarking LLM performance against that of children aged 7-10 on the same tasks. We find that instruction-tuned LLMs from the GPT family outperform other models, and often also children. Base-LLMs are mostly unable to solve ToM tasks, even with specialized prompting. We suggest that the interlinked evolution and development of language and ToM may help explain what instruction-tuning adds: rewarding cooperative communication that takes into account interlocutor and context. We conclude by arguing for a nuanced perspective on ToM in LLMs.

Current Large Language Models (LLMs) are unparalleled in their ability to generate grammatically correct, fluent text.LLMs are appearing rapidly, and debates on LLM capacities have taken off, but reflection is lagging behind.Thus, in this position paper, we first zoom in on the debate and critically assess three points recurring in critiques of LLM capacities: i) that LLMs only parrot statistical patterns in the training data; ii) that LLMs master formal but not functional language competence; and iii) that language learning in LLMs cannot inform human language learning.Drawing on empirical and theoretical arguments, we show that these points need more nuance.Second, we outline a pragmatic perspective on the issue of 'real' understanding and intentionality in LLMs.Understanding and intentionality pertain to unobservable mental states we attribute to other humans because they have pragmatic value: they allow us to abstract away from complex underlying mechanics and predict behaviour effectively.We reflect on the circumstances under which it would make sense for humans to similarly attribute mental states to LLMs, thereby outlining a pragmatic philosophical context for LLMs as an increasingly prominent technology in society.