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Mingde Ren

dblp:322/6483 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0009-1122-5073ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 50% Memory systems · 50%
Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Operating systems · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
1.012026
Coffer: An Efficient and Scalable TEE on RISC-V · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2026
Memory systems
memory protection
1.012026
Coffer: An Efficient and Scalable TEE on RISC-V · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2026
Processor architecture and microarchitecture › instruction set architecture
RISC-V
1.012026
Coffer: An Efficient and Scalable TEE on RISC-V · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

enclave modules · 3.0PMP virtualization · 3.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Coffer: An Efficient and Scalable TEE on RISC-V
abstract
Trusted Execution Environment(TEE) is a primary means for confidential computing. However, at the moment the RISC-V platform is limited for confidential computing because current RISC-V TEEs either lack scalability or compatibility. The reason for this dilemma in scalability and compatibility is that the standard isolation primitive on RISC-V,Physical Memory Protection(PMP), is not scalable. Meanwhile, previous enclave designs depend on theRich Execution Environment(REE) for OS functionalities, which increases domain switch frequency and enlarges the attack surface of the TEE. In this work, we propose Coffer, a scalable and efficient software-based TEE for the standard RISC-V platform. Coffer includes two core techniques:Logical PMP(LPMP) andEnclave Modules(EModules) to address the issues mentioned above. LPMP is a secure and efficient framework for PMP virtualization. It provides both scalability and hardware compatibility to Coffer. EModules are dynamically assembled lightweight libraries to provide enclaves with OS functionalities. The EModules provide Coffer with software compatibility and reduce theTrusted Computing Base(TCB) size of the enclaves. We implement and evaluate Coffer on commercially available RISC-V devices. The evaluation results show that Coffer can support 2, 000+ concurrent enclaves with negligible performance overhead. Particularly, LPMP supports enclave execution under heavy memory fragmentation with little performance overhead.
Mingde Ren, Jiatong Chen, Ziquan Wang, Fengwei Zhang, Zhenyu Ning, Heming Cui
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.1