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Noah Wöhler

dblp:325/3563 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
0as first author
5since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0002-4172-9565ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 4 · 4 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
5 papers
Systems and software security · 60% Usable security · 16% Authentication and access control · 16%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
3 papers
Software maintenance and evolution · 46% Empirical software engineering · 40% Programming languages and type systems · 14%

Topics — the 10 heaviest of 13, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Authentication and access control
authentication
0.812024
A Mixed-Methods Study on User Experiences and Challenges of Recovery Codes for an End-to-End Encrypted Service · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Systems and software security
memory safety
0.712023
"I wouldn't want my unsafe code to run my pacemaker": An Interview Study on the Use, Comprehension, and Perceived Risks of Unsafe Rust · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Systems and software security
software supply chain security
0.712023
"Always Contribute Back": A Qualitative Study on Security Challenges of the Open Source Supply Chain · SP 2023
Systems and software security › memory safety
unsafe rust
0.712023
"I wouldn't want my unsafe code to run my pacemaker": An Interview Study on the Use, Comprehension, and Perceived Risks of Unsafe Rust · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Software maintenance and evolution › software ecosystems
open source software ecosystem
0.712023
"Always Contribute Back": A Qualitative Study on Security Challenges of the Open Source Supply Chain · SP 2023
Systems and software security
open source security
0.612022
Committed to Trust: A Qualitative Study on Security & Trust in Open Source Software Projects · SP 2022
Empirical software engineering
developer studies
0.612022
Committed to Trust: A Qualitative Study on Security & Trust in Open Source Software Projects · SP 2022
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure messaging
end-to-end encryption
0.212024
A Mixed-Methods Study on User Experiences and Challenges of Recovery Codes for an End-to-End Encrypted Service · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Systems and software security
vulnerability management
0.212023
"Always Contribute Back": A Qualitative Study on Security Challenges of the Open Source Supply Chain · SP 2023
Programming languages and type systems
rust
0.212023
"I wouldn't want my unsafe code to run my pacemaker": An Interview Study on the Use, Comprehension, and Perceived Risks of Unsafe Rust · USENIX Security Symposium 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

semi-structured interviews · 2.5qualitative study · 2.5interview study · 1.3social media analysis · 0.8mixed-methods study · 0.8mixed-methods · 0.7mixed methods · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Analyzing Security and Privacy Advice During the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Twitter
abstract
The Russian Invasion of Ukraine in 2022 resulted in a rapidly changing cyber threat environment globally and incentivized the sharing of security and privacy advice on social media. Previous research found a strong impact of online security advice on end-user behavior.
Juliane Schmüser, Harshini Sri Ramulu, Noah Wöhler, Christian Stransky, Felix Bensmann, Dimitar Dimitrov 0002, Sebastian Schellhammer, Dominik Wermke, Stefan Dietze, Yasemin Acar, Sascha Fahl
CHI3
2024 A Mixed-Methods Study on User Experiences and Challenges of Recovery Codes for an End-to-End Encrypted Service
Sandra Höltervennhoff, Noah Wöhler, Arne Möhle, Marten Oltrogge, Yasemin Acar, Oliver Wiese, Sascha Fahl
USENIX Security Symposium2
2023 "Always Contribute Back": A Qualitative Study on Security Challenges of the Open Source Supply Chain
abstract
Open source components are ubiquitous in companies’ setups, processes, and software. Utilizing these external components as building blocks enables companies to leverage the benefits of open source software, allowing them to focus their efforts on features and faster delivery instead of writing their own components. But by introducing these components into their software stack, companies inherit unique security challenges and attack surfaces: including code from potentially unvetted contributors and obligations to assess and mitigate the impact of vulnerabilities in external components.In 25 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with software developers, architects, and engineers from industry projects, we investigate their projects’ processes, decisions, and considerations in the context of external open source code. We find that open source components play an important role in many of our participants’ projects, that most projects have some form of company policy or at least best practice for including external code, and that many developers wish for more developer-hours, dedicated teams, or tools to better audit included components. Based on our findings, we discuss implications for company stakeholders and the open source software ecosystem. Overall, we appeal to companies to not treat the open source ecosystem as a free (software) supply chain and instead to contribute towards the health and security of the overall software ecosystem they benefit from and are part of.
Dominik Wermke, Jan H. Klemmer, Noah Wöhler, Juliane Schmüser, Harshini Sri Ramulu, Yasemin Acar, Sascha Fahl
SP3
2023 "I wouldn't want my unsafe code to run my pacemaker": An Interview Study on the Use, Comprehension, and Perceived Risks of Unsafe Rust
Sandra Höltervennhoff, Philip Klostermeyer, Noah Wöhler, Yasemin Acar, Sascha Fahl
USENIX Security Symposium3
2022 Committed to Trust: A Qualitative Study on Security & Trust in Open Source Software Projects
abstract
Open Source Software plays an important role in many software ecosystems. Whether in operating systems, network stacks, or as low-level system drivers, software we encounter daily is permeated with code contributions from open source projects. Decentralized development and open collaboration in open source projects introduce unique challenges: code submissions from unknown entities, limited personpower for commit or dependency reviews, and bringing new contributors up-to-date in projects’ best practices & processes.In 27 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with owners, maintainers, and contributors from a diverse set of open source projects, we investigate their security and trust practices. For this, we explore projects’ behind-the-scene processes, provided guidance & policies, as well as incident handling & encountered challenges. We find that our participants’ projects are highly diverse both in deployed security measures and trust processes, as well as their underlying motivations. Based on our findings, we discuss implications for the open source software ecosystem and how the research community can better support open source projects in trust and security considerations. Overall, we argue for supporting open source projects in ways that consider their individual strengths and limitations, especially in the case of smaller projects with low contributor numbers and limited access to resources.
Dominik Wermke, Noah Wöhler, Jan H. Klemmer, Marcel Fourné, Yasemin Acar, Sascha Fahl
SP2