Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Maya Fuchs
dblp:331/3675
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Systems and software security · 38% Privacy and data protection · 29% Malware analysis · 19% | |
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Trustworthy machine learning · 100% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Systems and software security
binary analysis |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Assemblage: Automatic Binary Dataset Construction for Machine Learning · NeurIPS 2024 |
Systems and software security › binary analysis
binary function similarity |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Assemblage: Automatic Binary Dataset Construction for Machine Learning · NeurIPS 2024 |
Malware analysis
malware classification |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Assemblage: Automatic Binary Dataset Construction for Machine Learning · NeurIPS 2024 |
Privacy and data protection
differential privacy |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | A General Framework for Auditing Differentially Private Machine Learning · NeurIPS 2022 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
membership inference |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | A General Framework for Auditing Differentially Private Machine Learning · NeurIPS 2022 |
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy
privacy auditing |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | A General Framework for Auditing Differentially Private Machine Learning · NeurIPS 2022 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
statistical auditing · 1.1privacy search · 1.1influence-based poisoning attacks · 1.1machine learning · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Assemblage: Automatic Binary Dataset Construction for Machine LearningabstractBinary code is pervasive, and binary analysis is a key task in reverse engineering, malware classification, and vulnerability discovery. Unfortunately, while there exist large corpuses of malicious binaries, obtaining high-quality corpuses of benign binaries for modern systems has proven challenging (e.g., due to licensing issues). Consequently, machine learning based pipelines for binary analysis utilize either costly commercial corpuses (e.g., VirusTotal) or open-source binaries (e.g., coreutils) available in limited quantities. To address these issues, we present Assemblage: an extensible cloud-based distributed system that crawls, configures, and builds Windows PE binaries to obtain high-quality binary corpuses suitable for training state-of-the-art models in binary analysis. We have run Assemblage on AWS over the past year, producing 890k Windows PE and 428k Linux ELF binaries across 29 configurations. Assemblage is designed to be both reproducible and extensible, enabling users to publish "recipes" for their datasets, and facilitating the extraction of a wide array of features. We evaluated Assemblage by using its data to train modern learning-based pipelines for compiler provenance and binary function similarity. Our results illustrate the practical need for robust corpuses of high-quality Windows PE binaries in training modern learning-based binary analyses. Chang Liu 0188, Rebecca Saul, Yihao Sun 0003, Edward Raff, Maya Fuchs, Townsend Southard Pantano, James Holt, Kristopher K. Micinski |
NeurIPS | 5 |
| 2022 | A General Framework for Auditing Differentially Private Machine LearningabstractWe present a framework to statistically audit the privacy guarantee conferred by a differentially private machine learner in practice. While previous works have taken steps toward evaluating privacy loss through poisoning attacks or membership inference, they have been tailored to specific models or have demonstrated low statistical power. Our work develops a general methodology to empirically evaluate the privacy of differentially private machine learning implementations, combining improved privacy search and verification methods with a toolkit of influence-based poisoning attacks. We demonstrate significantly improved auditing power over previous approaches on a variety of models including logistic regression, Naive Bayes, and random forest. Our method can be used to detect privacy violations due to implementation errors or misuse. When violations are not present, it can aid in understanding the amount of information that can be leaked from a given dataset, algorithm, and privacy specification. Fred Lu, Joseph Munoz, Maya Fuchs, Tyler LeBlond, Elliott Zaresky-Williams, Edward Raff, Francis Ferraro, Brian Testa |
NeurIPS | 3 |