Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Manaswitha Edupalli

dblp:344/3040 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2023
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 67% Privacy and data protection · 33%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Distributed systems · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure computation on encrypted data
multiparty homomorphic encryption
0.712023
Scalable and Privacy-Preserving Federated Principal Component Analysis · SP 2023
Privacy and data protection
privacy-preserving data analysis
0.712023
Scalable and Privacy-Preserving Federated Principal Component Analysis · SP 2023
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure multiparty computation
0.712023
Scalable and Privacy-Preserving Federated Principal Component Analysis · SP 2023
Distributed systems
edge computing
0.212023
Scalable and Privacy-Preserving Federated Principal Component Analysis · SP 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

multiparty homomorphic encryption · 1.3interactive protocol · 1.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 Scalable and Privacy-Preserving Federated Principal Component Analysis
abstract
Principal component analysis (PCA) is an essential algorithm for dimensionality reduction in many data science domains. We address the problem of performing a federated PCA on private data distributed among multiple data providers while ensuring data confidentiality. Our solution, SF-PCA, is an end-to-end secure system that preserves the confidentiality of both the original data and all intermediate results in a passive-adversary model with up to all-but-one colluding parties. SF-PCA jointly leverages multiparty homomorphic encryption, interactive protocols, and edge computing to efficiently interleave computations on local cleartext data with operations on collectively encrypted data. SF-PCA obtains results as accurate as non-secure centralized solutions, independently of the data distribution among the parties. It scales linearly or better with the dataset dimensions and with the number of data providers. SF-PCA is more precise than existing approaches that approximate the solution by combining local analysis results, and between 3x and 250x faster than privacy-preserving alternatives based solely on secure multiparty computation or homomorphic encryption. Our work demonstrates the practical applicability of secure and federated PCA on private distributed datasets.
David Froelicher, Hyunghoon Cho, Manaswitha Edupalli, João Sá Sousa, Jean-Philippe Bossuat, Apostolos Pyrgelis, Juan Ramón Troncoso-Pastoriza, Bonnie Berger, Jean-Pierre Hubaux
SP3