Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Sandra Höltervennhoff
dblp:349/7794
· DBLP profile ↗
7ranked-venue papers
3as first author
7since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0003-4284-0473ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 6 · 2 first-author · 6 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
6 papers |
Systems and software security · 40% Authentication and access control · 20% Usable security · 20% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers |
Empirical software engineering · 54% Programming languages and type systems · 46% |
Topics — the 13 heaviest of 13, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Web and mobile security
misinformation |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | "That's another doom I haven't thought about": A User Study on AI Labels as a Safeguard Against Image-Based Misinformation · CHI 2026 |
Authentication and access control
authentication |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | A Mixed-Methods Study on User Experiences and Challenges of Recovery Codes for an End-to-End Encrypted Service · USENIX Security Symposium 2024 |
Usable security › developer-centered security
developer security practices |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Everyone for Themselves? A Qualitative Study about Individual Security Setups of Open Source Software Contributors · SP 2024 |
Systems and software security
secure software development |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Skipping the Security Side Quests: A Qualitative Study on Security Practices and Challenges in Game Development · CCS 2024 |
Systems and software security
software supply chain security |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Everyone for Themselves? A Qualitative Study about Individual Security Setups of Open Source Software Contributors · SP 2024 |
Usable security
authentication usability |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | "We've Disabled MFA for You": An Evaluation of the Security and Usability of Multi-Factor Authentication Recovery Deployments · CCS 2023 |
Systems and software security
memory safety |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | "I wouldn't want my unsafe code to run my pacemaker": An Interview Study on the Use, Comprehension, and Perceived Risks of Unsafe Rust · USENIX Security Symposium 2023 |
Authentication and access control
multi-factor authentication |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | "We've Disabled MFA for You": An Evaluation of the Security and Usability of Multi-Factor Authentication Recovery Deployments · CCS 2023 |
Systems and software security › memory safety
unsafe rust |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | "I wouldn't want my unsafe code to run my pacemaker": An Interview Study on the Use, Comprehension, and Perceived Risks of Unsafe Rust · USENIX Security Symposium 2023 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure messaging
end-to-end encryption |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | A Mixed-Methods Study on User Experiences and Challenges of Recovery Codes for an End-to-End Encrypted Service · USENIX Security Symposium 2024 |
Privacy and data protection › privacy management › user-controlled privacy › personal data management
user data protection |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Skipping the Security Side Quests: A Qualitative Study on Security Practices and Challenges in Game Development · CCS 2024 |
Empirical software engineering
developer studies |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Everyone for Themselves? A Qualitative Study about Individual Security Setups of Open Source Software Contributors · SP 2024 |
Programming languages and type systems
rust |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | "I wouldn't want my unsafe code to run my pacemaker": An Interview Study on the Use, Comprehension, and Perceived Risks of Unsafe Rust · USENIX Security Symposium 2023 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
semi-structured interviews · 1.5qualitative analysis · 1.5interview study · 1.3survey · 1.0focus groups · 1.0qualitative study · 0.8mixed-methods study · 0.8user study · 0.7mixed-methods · 0.7mixed methods · 0.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | "That's another doom I haven't thought about": A User Study on AI Labels as a Safeguard Against Image-Based MisinformationabstractAs generative AI is increasingly contributing to the spread of deceptively realistic misinformation, lawmakers have introduced regulations requiring the disclosure of AI-generated content. However, it is unclear if labels reduce the risk of users falling for AI-generated misinformation. To address this research gap, we study the effect of labels on users’ perception and the implications of mislabeling, focusing on AI-generated images. We first explored users’ opinions and expectations of labels using five focus groups. Although participants were wary of practical implementations, they considered labeling helpful in identifying AI-generated images and avoiding deception. Second, we conducted a survey with 1 354 participants to assess how labels affect users’ ability to recognize misinformation. While labels reduced participants’ belief in false claims supported by AI-generated images, we found evidence of overreliance, leading to unintended side effects: Participants were more susceptible to false claims accompanied by human-made images, and were more hesitant to believe true claims illustrated with labeled AI-generated images. Sandra Höltervennhoff, Jonas Ricker, Maike M. Raphael, Charlotte Schwedes, Rebecca Weil, Asja Fischer, Thorsten Holz, Lea Schönherr, Sascha Fahl |
CHI | 1 |
| 2024 | Skipping the Security Side Quests: A Qualitative Study on Security Practices and Challenges in Game DevelopmentabstractThe video game market is one of the biggest for software products. Video game development has progressed in the last decades to complex and multifaceted endeavors. Games-as-a-Service significantly impacted distribution and gameplay, requiring providers and developers to consider factors beyond game functionality, including security and privacy. New security challenges emerged, including authentication, payment security, and user data or asset protection. However, the security community lacks in-depth insights into the security experiences, challenges, and practices of modern video game development. This paper aims to address this gap in research and highlights the criticality of considering security in the process. Philip Klostermeyer, Sabrina Klivan, Sandra Höltervennhoff, Alexander Krause 0002, Niklas Busch, Sascha Fahl |
CCS | 3 |
| 2024 | Everyone for Themselves? A Qualitative Study about Individual Security Setups of Open Source Software ContributorsabstractTo increase open-source software supply chain security, protecting the development environment of contributors against attacks is crucial. For example, contributors must protect authentication credentials for software repositories, code-signing keys, and their systems from malware.Previous incidents illustrated that open-source contributors struggle with protecting their development environment. In contrast to companies, open-source software projects cannot easily enforce security guidelines for development environments. Instead, contributors’ security setups are likely heterogeneous regarding chosen technologies and strategies.To the best of our knowledge, we perform the first in-depth qualitative investigation of the security of open-source software contributors’ individual security setups, their motivation, decision-making, and sentiments, and the potential impact on open-source software supply chain security. Therefore, we conduct 20 semi-structured interviews with a diverse set of experienced contributors to critical open-source software projects.Overall, we find that contributors have a generally high affinity for security. However, security practices are rarely discussed in the community or enforced by projects. Furthermore, we see a strong influence of social mechanisms, such as trust, respect, or politeness, further impeding the sharing of security knowledge and best practices.We conclude our work with a discussion of the impact of our findings on open-source software and supply chain security, and make recommendations for the open-source software community. Sabrina Klivan, Sandra Höltervennhoff, Rebecca Panskus, Karola Marky, Sascha Fahl |
SP | 2 |
| 2024 | A Mixed-Methods Study on User Experiences and Challenges of Recovery Codes for an End-to-End Encrypted Service
Sandra Höltervennhoff, Noah Wöhler, Arne Möhle, Marten Oltrogge, Yasemin Acar, Oliver Wiese, Sascha Fahl |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 2023 | "We've Disabled MFA for You": An Evaluation of the Security and Usability of Multi-Factor Authentication Recovery DeploymentsabstractMulti-Factor Authentication is intended to strengthen the security of password-based authentication by adding another factor, such as hardware tokens or one-time passwords using mobile apps. Sabrina Klivan, Sandra Höltervennhoff, Nicolas Huaman Groschopf, Alexander Krause 0002, Lucy Simko, Yasemin Acar, Sascha Fahl |
CCS | 2 |
| 2023 | "Would You Give the Same Priority to the Bank and a Game? I Do Not!" Exploring Credential Management Strategies and Obstacles during Password Manager Setup
Sabrina Klivan, Sandra Höltervennhoff, Nicolas Huaman Groschopf, Yasemin Acar, Sascha Fahl |
SOUPS | 2 |
| 2023 | "I wouldn't want my unsafe code to run my pacemaker": An Interview Study on the Use, Comprehension, and Perceived Risks of Unsafe Rust
Sandra Höltervennhoff, Philip Klostermeyer, Noah Wöhler, Yasemin Acar, Sascha Fahl |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |