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Tommaso Bondi

dblp:351/0403 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
3as first author
3since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0003-4572-0709ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 3 first-author · 3 since 2021Theory of computation · 3 · 3 first-author · 3 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
3 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%
Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
2 papers
Computational social science and digital humanities · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Privacy and data protection · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Computational social science and digital humanities › social computing
online reviews
1.322023
The Good, The Bad and The Picky: Reference Dependence and the Reversal of Product Ratings · EC 2023
Alone, Together: A Model of Social (Mis)Learning from Consumer Reviews · EC 2023
Privacy and data protection
privacy regulation
0.812024
Privacy and Polarization: An Inference-Based Framework · EC 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › multi-agent systems › multi-agent learning
social learning
0.712023
Alone, Together: A Model of Social (Mis)Learning from Consumer Reviews · EC 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

game theory · 2.6inference framework · 1.5empirical analysis · 1.5reference dependence model · 1.3bayesian learning · 1.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Privacy and Polarization: An Inference-Based Framework
abstract
Digital publishers increasingly use advertising as a monetization strategy. At the core of ad-based monetization is behavioral ad targeting, which creates a sustainable revenue stream for publishers and keeps online content mostly free. However, behavioral ad targeting requires the collection and use of consumer-level data, which leads to privacy concerns among consumers. Although the main intent of privacy regulations is to safeguard consumer privacy, a consistent finding from past empirical research is that privacy regulation hurts digital publishers. Specifically, prior research suggests that the revenue loss due to privacy regulations is more pronounced for general interest (vs. specialized) publishers, who have greater uncertainty about their consumer types without consumer tracking. For example, in the absence of consumer tracking, a mainstream news website such as the New York Times - which attracts a highly heterogeneous pool of readers - has a harder time inferring consumer types and interests in order to show them relevant ads, compared to a niche, ideologically extreme website such as Infowars.
Tommaso Bondi, Omid Rafieian, Yunfei (Jesse) Yao
EC1
2023 Alone, Together: A Model of Social (Mis)Learning from Consumer Reviews
abstract
The Internet has had a significant impact on how consumers discover and evaluate products, particularly by means of consumer reviews. Learning from reviews, however, is made difficult by the fact that, to some extent, reviews measure idiosyncratic consumer-product fit, and not just objective quality. In this context, how and what can consumers learn?
Tommaso Bondi
EC1
2023 The Good, The Bad and The Picky: Reference Dependence and the Reversal of Product Ratings
abstract
We study the impact of consumer quality-based self-selection on online reviews. Consumers differ in their expertise, which has two effects. First, expertise is instrumental to choice: Experts purchase better products than Non-Experts. Second, because of their superior choices, Experts endogenously form higher reference points, which leads them to post harsher ratings for a given quality. Combined, these two facts imply a bias against higher-quality products. When this bias gets large, ratings are non-monotonic in quality: lower-quality products can obtain higher ratings than superior alternatives, thanks to the lower standard they are held to.
Tommaso Bondi, Michelangelo Rossi, Ryan Stevens
EC1