Generative AI systems may pose serious risks to individuals vulnerable to eating disorders. Existing safeguards tend to overlook subtle but clinically significant cues, leaving many risks unaddressed. To better understand the nature of these risks, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 15 clinicians, researchers, and advocates with expertise in eating disorders. Using abductive qualitative analysis, we developed an expert-guided taxonomy of generative AI risks across seven categories: (1) providing generalized health advice; (2) encouraging disordered behaviors; (3) supporting symptom concealment; (4) creating thinspiration; (5) reinforcing negative self-beliefs; (6) promoting excessive focus on the body; and (7) perpetuating narrow views about eating disorders. Our results demonstrate how certain user interactions with generative AI systems intersect with clinical features of eating disorders in ways that may intensify risk. We discuss implications of our work, including approaches for risk assessment, safeguard design, and participatory evaluation practices with domain experts.

Foundation models (FMs) provide societal benefits but also amplify risks. Governments, companies, and researchers have proposed regulatory frameworks, acceptable use policies, and safety benchmarks in response. However, existing public benchmarks often define safety categories based on previous literature, intuitions, or common sense, leading to disjointed sets of categories for risks specified in recent regulations and policies, which makes it challenging to evaluate and compare FMs across these benchmarks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AIR-BENCH 2024, the first AI safety benchmark aligned with emerging government regulations and company policies, following the regulation-based safety categories grounded in the AI Risks taxonomy, AIR 2024. AIR 2024 decomposes 8 government regulations and 16 company policies into a four-tiered safety taxonomy with 314 granular risk categories in the lowest tier. AIR-BENCH 2024 contains 5,694 diverse prompts spanning these categories, with manual curation and human auditing to ensure quality. We evaluate leading language models on AIR-BENCH 2024 uncovering insights into their alignment with specified safety concerns. By bridging the gap between public benchmarks and practical AI risks, AIR-BENCH 2024 provides a foundation for assessing model safety across jurisdictions, fostering the development of safer and more responsible AI systems.

"Machine unlearning" is a popular proposed solution for mitigating the existence of content in an AI model that is problematic for legal or moral reasons, including privacy, copyright, safety, and more. For example, unlearning is often invoked as a solution for removing the effects of specific information from a generative-AI model's parameters, e.g., a particular individual's personal data or the inclusion of copyrighted content in the model's training data. Unlearning is also proposed as a way to prevent a model from generating targeted types of information in its outputs, e.g., generations that closely resemble a particular individual's data or reflect the concept of "Spiderman." Both of these goals--the targeted removal of information from a model and the targeted suppression of information from a model's outputs--present various technical and substantive challenges. We provide a framework for ML researchers and policymakers to think rigorously about these challenges, identifying several mismatches between the goals of unlearning and feasible implementations. These mismatches explain why unlearning is not a general-purpose solution for circumscribing generative-AI model behavior in service of broader positive impact.

Foundation models are critical digital technologies with sweeping societal impact that necessitates transparency. To codify how foundation model developers should provide transparency about the development and deployment of their models, we propose Foundation Model Transparency Reports, drawing upon the transparency reporting practices in social media. While external documentation of societal harms prompted social media transparency reports, our objective is to institutionalize transparency reporting for foundation models while the industry is still nascent. To design our reports, we identify 6 design principles given the successes and shortcomings of social media transparency reporting. To further schematize our reports, we draw upon the 100 transparency indicators from the Foundation Model Transparency Index. Given these indicators, we measure the extent to which they overlap with the transparency requirements included in six prominent government policies (e.g. the EU AI Act, the US Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy AI). Well-designed transparency reports could reduce compliance costs, in part due to overlapping regulatory requirements across different jurisdictions. We encourage foundation model developers to regularly publish transparency reports, building upon recommendations from the G7 and the White House.

As foundation models have accumulated hundreds of millions of users, developers have begun to take steps to prevent harmful types of uses. One salient intervention that foundation model developers adopt is acceptable use policies—legally binding policies that prohibit users from using a model for specific purposes. This paper identifies acceptable use policies from 30 foundation model developers, analyzes the use restrictions they contain, and argues that acceptable use policies are an important lens for understanding the regulation of foundation models. Taken together, developers’ acceptable use policies include 127 distinct use restrictions; the wide variety in the number and type of use restrictions may create fragmentation across the AI supply chain. Companies also employ acceptable use policies to prevent competitors or specific industries from making use of their models. Developers alone decide what constitutes acceptable use, and rarely provide transparency about how they enforce their policies. In practice, acceptable use policies are difficult to enforce, and scrupulous enforcement can act as a barrier to researcher access and limit beneficial uses of foundation models. Acceptable use policies for foundation models are an early example of self-regulation that have a significant impact on the market for foundation models and the AI ecosystem.

Foundation models are powerful technologies: how they are released publicly directly shapes their societal impact. In this position paper, we focus on *open* foundation models, defined here as those with broadly available model weights (e.g., Llama 3, Stable Diffusion XL). We identify five distinctive properties (e.g., greater customizability, poor monitoring) that mediate their benefits and risks. Open foundation models present significant benefits, with some caveats, that span innovation, competition, the distribution of decision-making power, and transparency. To understand their risks of misuse, we design a risk assessment framework for analyzing their *marginal risk*. Across several misuse vectors (e.g., cyberattacks, bioweapons), we find that current research is insufficient to effectively characterize the marginal risk of open foundation models relative to pre-existing technologies. The framework helps explain why the marginal risk is low in some cases, clarifies disagreements about misuse risks by revealing that past work has focused on different subsets of the framework with different assumptions, and articulates a way forward for more constructive debate. Overall, our work helps support a more grounded assessment of the societal impact of open foundation models by outlining what research is needed to empirically validate their theoretical benefits and risks.

Independent evaluation and red teaming are critical for identifying the risks posed by generative AI systems. However, the terms of service and enforcement strategies used by prominent AI companies to deter model misuse have disincentives on good faith safety evaluations. This causes some researchers to fear that conducting such research or releasing their findings will result in account suspensions or legal reprisal. Although some companies offer researcher access programs, they are an inadequate substitute for independent research access, as they have limited community representation, receive inadequate funding, and lack independence from corporate incentives. We propose that major generative AI developers commit to providing a legal and technical safe harbor, protecting public interest safety research and removing the threat of account suspensions or legal reprisal. These proposals emerged from our collective experience conducting safety, privacy, and trustworthiness research on generative AI systems, where norms and incentives could be better aligned with public interests, without exacerbating model misuse. We believe these commitments are a necessary step towards more inclusive and unimpeded community efforts to tackle the risks of generative AI.

General-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) systems are built on massive swathes of public web data, assembled into corpora such as C4, RefinedWeb, and Dolma. To our knowledge, we conduct the first, large-scale, longitudinal audit of the consent protocols for the web domains underlying AI training corpora. Our audit of 14,000 web domains provides an expansive view of crawlable web data and how codified data use preferences are changing over time. We observe a proliferation of AI-specific clauses to limit use, acute differences in restrictions on AI developers, as well as general inconsistencies between websites' expressed intentions in their Terms of Service and their robots.txt. We diagnose these as symptoms of ineffective web protocols, not designed to cope with the widespread re-purposing of the internet for AI. Our longitudinal analyses show that in a single year (2023-2024) there has been a rapid crescendo of data restrictions from web sources, rendering ~5\%+ of all tokens in C4, or 28%+ of the most actively maintained, critical sources in C4, fully restricted from use. For Terms of Service crawling restrictions, a full 45% of C4 is now restricted. If respected or enforced, these restrictions are rapidly biasing the diversity, freshness, and scaling laws for general-purpose AI systems. We hope to illustrate the emerging crises in data consent, for both developers and creators. The foreclosure of much of the open web will impact not only commercial AI, but also non-commercial AI and academic research.