Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Leiyong Qin
dblp:361/1113
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0003-4406-8106ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
private set intersection |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Efficient Multiparty Probabilistic Threshold Private Set Intersection · CCS 2023 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure multiparty computation |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Efficient Multiparty Probabilistic Threshold Private Set Intersection · CCS 2023 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › private set intersection
threshold private set intersection |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Efficient Multiparty Probabilistic Threshold Private Set Intersection · CCS 2023 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
malicious security |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | Efficient Multiparty Probabilistic Threshold Private Set Intersection · CCS 2023 |
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Efficient Multiparty Probabilistic Threshold Private Set IntersectionabstractThreshold private set intersection (TPSI) allows multiple parties to learn the intersection of their input sets only if the size of the intersection is greater than a certain threshold. This task has been demonstrated useful with practical applications, and thus many active research has been conducted. However, current solutions for TPSI are still slow for large input sets e.g., n=2^20 for the set size, and the potentially practical candidates are only secure against semi-honest adversaries. For the basic PSI, there have been efficient and scalable solutions, even in the malicious settings. It is interesting to determine whether adding a threshold feature would inherently incur a large overhead to PSI. Feng-Hao Liu, En Zhang, Leiyong Qin |
CCS | 3 |