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Kecen Li

dblp:361/7589 · DBLP profile ↗
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9ranked-venue papers
3as first author
9since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0004-2266-8113ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 8 · 2 first-author · 8 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
8 papers
Privacy and data protection · 57% Security and privacy of machine learning · 27% Digital forensics and information hiding · 16%
Artificial intelligence
8 papers
Trustworthy machine learning · 34% Generative modeling · 33% Reinforcement learning · 27%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Compilers and program optimization · 100%

Topics — the 15 heaviest of 15, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Privacy and data protection
differential privacy
4.552026
PrivCode: When Code Generation Meets Differential Privacy · NDSS 2026
PrivORL: Differentially Private Synthetic Dataset for Offline Reinforcement Learning · NDSS 2026
From Easy to Hard: Building a Shortcut for Differentially Private Image Synthesis · SP 2025
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy
synthetic data generation
1.822026
PrivORL: Differentially Private Synthetic Dataset for Offline Reinforcement Learning · NDSS 2026
PrivImage: Differentially Private Synthetic Image Generation using Diffusion Models with Semantic-Aware Pretraining · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
offline reinforcement learning
1.332026
Baffle: Hiding Backdoors in Offline Reinforcement Learning Datasets · SP 2024
PrivORL: Differentially Private Synthetic Dataset for Offline Reinforcement Learning · NDSS 2026
TrajDeleter: Enabling Trajectory Forgetting in Offline Reinforcement Learning Agents · NDSS 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
jailbreak attack
1.012026
ENCHTABLE: Unified Safety Alignment Transfer in Fine-Tuned Large Language Models · SP 2026
Security and privacy of machine learning › large language model alignment
safety alignment
1.012026
ENCHTABLE: Unified Safety Alignment Transfer in Fine-Tuned Large Language Models · SP 2026
Compilers and program optimization
code generation
1.012026
PrivCode: When Code Generation Meets Differential Privacy · NDSS 2026
Machine learning › Generative modeling
image generation
0.912025
DPImageBench: A Unified Benchmark for Differentially Private Image Synthesis · CCS 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
machine unlearning
0.912025
TrajDeleter: Enabling Trajectory Forgetting in Offline Reinforcement Learning Agents · NDSS 2025
Digital forensics and information hiding › watermarking › generative model watermarking
diffusion model watermarking
0.912025
GaussMarker: Robust Dual-Domain Watermark for Diffusion Models · ICML 2025
Digital forensics and information hiding
watermarking
0.912025
GaussMarker: Robust Dual-Domain Watermark for Diffusion Models · ICML 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
data poisoning
0.812024
Baffle: Hiding Backdoors in Offline Reinforcement Learning Datasets · SP 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack
0.812024
Baffle: Hiding Backdoors in Offline Reinforcement Learning Datasets · SP 2024
Machine learning › Generative modeling
diffusion model
0.732025
From Easy to Hard: Building a Shortcut for Differentially Private Image Synthesis · SP 2025
GaussMarker: Robust Dual-Domain Watermark for Diffusion Models · ICML 2025
PrivImage: Differentially Private Synthetic Image Generation using Diffusion Models with Semantic-Aware Pretraining · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model fine-tuning
0.312026
ENCHTABLE: Unified Safety Alignment Transfer in Fine-Tuned Large Language Models · SP 2026
Security and privacy of machine learning › poisoning attack
training data poisoning
0.212024
Baffle: Hiding Backdoors in Offline Reinforcement Learning Datasets · SP 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

differential privacy · 4.0safety vector distillation · 2.0offline reinforcement learning · 2.0neural tangent kernel · 2.0interference-aware merging · 2.0pipelined injector · 1.7learnable gaussian noise restorer · 1.7detection score fusion · 1.7curriculum learning · 1.7benchmarking · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 PrivORL: Differentially Private Synthetic Dataset for Offline Reinforcement Learning
Chen Gong 0005, Zheng Liu 0022, Kecen Li, Tianhao Wang 0001
NDSS3
2026 PrivCode: When Code Generation Meets Differential Privacy
Zheng Liu 0022, Chen Gong 0005, Terry Yue Zhuo, Kecen Li, Weichen Yu, Matt Fredrikson, Tianhao Wang 0001
NDSS4
2026 ENCHTABLE: Unified Safety Alignment Transfer in Fine-Tuned Large Language Models
abstract
Many machine learning models are fine-tuned from large language models (LLMs) to achieve high performance in specialized domains like code generation, biomedical analysis, and mathematical problem solving. However, this fine-tuning process often introduces a critical vulnerability: the systematic degradation of safety alignment, undermining ethical guidelines and increasing the risk of harmful outputs. Addressing this challenge, we introduce EnchTable, a novel framework designed to transfer and maintain safety alignment in downstream LLMs without requiring extensive retraining. EnchTable leverages a Neural Tangent Kernel (NTK)-based safety vector distillation method to decouple safety constraints from task-specific reasoning, ensuring compatibility across diverse model architectures and sizes. Additionally, our interference-aware merging technique effectively balances safety and utility, minimizing performance compromises across various task domains. We implemented a fully functional prototype of EnchTable on three different task domains and three distinct LLM architectures, and evaluated its performance through extensive experiments on eleven diverse datasets, assessing both utility and model safety. Our evaluations include LLMs from different vendors, demonstrating EnchTable's generalization capability. Furthermore, EnchTable exhibits robust resistance to static and dynamic jailbreaking attacks, outperforming vendor-released safety models in mitigating adversarial prompts. Comparative analyses with six parameter modification methods and two inference-time alignment baselines reveal that EnchTable achieves a significantly lower unsafe rate, higher utility score, and universal applicability across different task domains. Additionally, we validate EnchTable can be seamlessly integrated into various deployment pipelines without significant overhead.
Jialin Wu 0001, Kecen Li, Xinfeng Li, XiaoFeng Wang 0001, Cheng Hong 0001
SP2
2025 DPImageBench: A Unified Benchmark for Differentially Private Image Synthesis
abstract
Differentially private (DP) image synthesis aims to generate artificial images that retain the properties of a sensitive image dataset while protecting the privacy of individual images within the dataset. Despite recent advancements, we find that inconsistent--and sometimes flawed--evaluation protocols have been applied across studies. This not only impedes the understanding of current methods but also hinders future advancements in the field. To address the issue, this paper introduces DPImageBench, with thoughtful design across several dimensions: (1) Methods. We study twelve prominent methods and systematically characterize each based on model architecture, pretraining strategy, and privacy mechanism. (2) Evaluation. We include nine datasets and seven metrics to thoroughly assess these methods. Notably, we find that the common practice of selecting downstream classifiers based on the highest accuracy on sensitive test sets not only violates DP but also overestimates the utility. DPImageBench corrects for it. (3) Platform. Despite the wide variety of methods and evaluation protocols, DPImageBench provides a standardized interface that accommodates current and future implementations within a unified framework. With DPImageBench, we have several noteworthy findings. For example, contrary to the common wisdom that pretraining on public image datasets is usually beneficial, we find that the distributional similarity between pretraining and sensitive images significantly impacts the performance of the synthetic images and does not always yield improvements. The source code is available.
Chen Gong 0005, Kecen Li, Zinan Lin 0001, Tianhao Wang 0001
CCS2
2025 GaussMarker: Robust Dual-Domain Watermark for Diffusion Models
abstract
As Diffusion Models (DM) generate increasingly realistic images, related issues such as copyright and misuse have become a growing concern. Watermarking is one of the promising solutions. Existing methods inject the watermark into the *single-domain* of initial Gaussian noise for generation, which suffers from unsatisfactory robustness. This paper presents the first *dual-domain* DM watermarking approach using a pipelined injector to consistently embed watermarks in both the spatial and frequency domains. To further boost robustness against certain image manipulations and advanced attacks, we introduce a model-independent learnable Gaussian Noise Restorer (GNR) to refine Gaussian noise extracted from manipulated images and enhance detection robustness by integrating the detection scores of both watermarks. GaussMarker efficiently achieves state-of-the-art performance under eight image distortions and four advanced attacks across three versions of Stable Diffusion with better recall and lower false positive rates, as preferred in real applications.
Kecen Li, Xinwen Hou
ICML1
2025 TrajDeleter: Enabling Trajectory Forgetting in Offline Reinforcement Learning Agents
Chen Gong 0005, Kecen Li, Tianhao Wang 0001
NDSS2
2025 From Easy to Hard: Building a Shortcut for Differentially Private Image Synthesis
abstract
Differentially private (DP) image synthesis aims to generate synthetic images from a sensitive dataset, alleviating the privacy leakage concerns of organizations sharing and utilizing synthetic images. Although previous methods have significantly progressed, especially in training diffusion models on sensitive images with DP Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD), they still suffer from unsatisfactory performance. In this work, inspired by curriculum learning, we propose a two-stage DP image synthesis framework, where diffusion models learn to generate DP synthetic images from easy to hard. Unlike existing methods that directly use DP-SGD to train diffusion models, we propose an easy stage in the beginning, where diffusion models learn simple features of the sensitive images. To facilitate this easy stage, we propose to use ‘central images’, simply aggregations of random samples of the sensitive dataset. Intuitively, although those central images do not show details, they demonstrate useful characteristics of all images and only incur minimal privacy costs, thus helping early-phase model training. We conduct experiments to present that on the average of four investigated image datasets, the fidelity and utility metrics of our synthetic images are 33.1% and 2.1% better than the state-of-the-art method. The replication package and datasets can be accessed online11.https://github.comJSunnierLee/DP-FETA.
Kecen Li, Chen Gong 0005, Yuzhong Zhao, Xinwen Hou, Tianhao Wang 0001
SP1
2024 Baffle: Hiding Backdoors in Offline Reinforcement Learning Datasets
abstract
Reinforcement learning (RL) makes an agent learn from trial-and-error experiences gathered during the interaction with the environment. Recently, offline RL has become a popular RL paradigm because it saves the interactions with environments. In offline RL, data providers share large pre-collected datasets, and others can train high-quality agents without interacting with the environments. This paradigm has demonstrated effectiveness in critical tasks like robot control, autonomous driving, etc. However, less attention is paid to investigating the security threats to the offline RL system. This paper focuses on backdoor attacks, where some perturbations are added to the data (observations) such that given normal observations, the agent takes high-rewards actions, and low-reward actions on observations injected with triggers. In this paper, we propose Baffle (Backdoor Attack for Offline Reinforcement Learning), an approach that automatically implants backdoors to RL agents by poisoning the offline RL dataset, and evaluate how different offline RL algorithms react to this attack. Our experiments conducted on four tasks and nine offline RL algorithms expose a disquieting fact: none of the existing offline RL algorithms has been immune to such a backdoor attack. More specifically, Baffle modifies 10% of the datasets for four tasks (3 robotic controls and 1 autonomous driving). Agents trained on the poisoned datasets perform well in normal settings. However, when triggers are presented, the agents’ performance decreases drastically by 63.2%, 53.9%, 64.7%, and 47.4% in the four tasks on average. The backdoor still persists after fine-tuning poisoned agents on clean datasets. We further show that the inserted backdoor is also hard to be detected by a popular defensive method. This paper calls attention to developing more effective protection for the open-source offline RL dataset.
Chen Gong 0005, Zhou Yang 0003, Yunpeng Bai, Junda He, Jieke Shi, Kecen Li, Arunesh Sinha, Xinwen Hou, David Lo 0001, Tianhao Wang 0001
SP6
2024 PrivImage: Differentially Private Synthetic Image Generation using Diffusion Models with Semantic-Aware Pretraining
Kecen Li, Chen Gong 0005, Yuzhong Zhao, Xinwen Hou, Tianhao Wang 0001
USENIX Security Symposium1