The existence of EFX allocations is one of the most significant open questions in fair division. Recent work by Christodoulou, Fiat, Koutsoupias, and Sgouritsa ("Fair allocation in graphs," EC 2023) establishes the existence of EFX allocations for graphical valuations, when agents are vertices in a graph, items are edges, and each item has zero value for all agents other than those at its endpoints. Thus, in this setting, each good has non-zero value for at most two agents, and there is at most one good valued by any pair of agents. This marks one of the few cases when an exact and complete EFX allocation is known to exist for more than three agents. In this work, we partially extend these results to multi-graphs, when each pair of vertices can have more than one edge between them. The existence of EFX allocations in multi-graphs is a natural open question given their existence in simple graphs. We show that EFX allocations exist, and can be computed in polynomial time, for agents with cancelable valuations in the following cases: (i) bipartite multi-graphs, (ii) multi-trees with monotone valuations, and (iii) multi-graphs with girth (2t-1), where t is the chromatic number of the multi-graph. The existence of EFX in cycle multi-graphs follows from (i), (iii), and the known existence of EFX for three agents.

Equitability (EQ) in fair division requires that items be allocated such that all agents value the bundle they receive equally. With indivisible items, an equitable allocation may not exist, and hence we instead consider a meaningful analog, EQx, that requires equitability up to any item. EQx allocations exist for monotone, additive valuations. However, if (1) the agents' valuations are not additive or (2) the set of indivisible items includes both goods and chores (positively and negatively valued items), then prior to the current work it was not known whether EQx allocations exist or not. We study both the existence and efficient computation of EQx allocations. (1) For monotone valuations (not necessarily additive), we show that EQx allocations always exist. Also, for the large class of weakly well-layered valuations, EQx allocations can be found in polynomial time. Further, we prove that approximately EQx allocations can be computed efficiently under general monotone valuations. (2) For non-monotone valuations, we show that an EQx allocation may not exist, even for two agents with additive valuations. Under some special cases, however, we show existence and efficient computability of EQx allocations. This includes the case of two agents with additive valuations where each item is either a good or a chore, and there are no mixed items.