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Yang Li 0073

dblp:37/4190-73 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2020
0000-0003-0132-2127ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Privacy and data protection · 87% Biometric security · 13%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Privacy and data protection › online tracking
device tracking
0.412020
Nowhere to Hide: Cross-modal Identity Leakage between Biometrics and Devices · WWW 2020
Biometric security
biometric recognition
0.112020
Nowhere to Hide: Cross-modal Identity Leakage between Biometrics and Devices · WWW 2020

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

multimodal sensing · 0.4clustering · 0.4
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2020 Nowhere to Hide: Cross-modal Identity Leakage between Biometrics and Devices
abstract
Along with the benefits of Internet of Things (IoT) come potential privacy risks, since billions of the connected devices are granted permission to track information about their users and communicate it to other parties over the Internet. Of particular interest to the adversary is the user identity which constantly plays an important role in launching attacks. While the exposure of a certain type of physical biometrics or device identity is extensively studied, the compound effect of leakage from both sides remains unknown in multi-modal sensing environments. In this work, we explore the feasibility of the compound identity leakage across cyber-physical spaces and unveil that co-located smart device IDs (e.g., smartphone MAC addresses) and physical biometrics (e.g., facial/vocal samples) are side channels to each other. It is demonstrated that our method is robust to various observation noise in the wild and an attacker can comprehensively profile victims in multi-dimension with nearly zero analysis effort. Two real-world experiments on different biometrics and device IDs show that the presented approach can compromise more than 70% of device IDs and harvests multiple biometric clusters with purity at the same time.
Xiaoxuan Lu 0001, Yang Li 0073, Yuanbo Xiangli, Zhengxiong Li
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