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Leqi Zhao

dblp:371/3784 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
5since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0001-9651-3334ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer networks
4 papers
Wireless sensing and localization · 67% Internet of things and sensor networks · 33%
Network and information security
2 papers
Hardware security and side channels · 67% Privacy and data protection · 27% Authentication and access control · 6%
Computer graphics and multimedia
1 paper
Multimedia systems and quality of experience · 50% Image and video processing · 50%
Human-computer interaction and pervasive computing
1 paper
Ubiquitous computing and smart environments · 100%

Topics — the 11 heaviest of 13, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack
1.822026
Fast or Secure? Push the Limit of Privacy Leakage Threat via Charging Side-Channel Attacks · WWW 2026
Privacy Leakage in Wireless Charging · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2024
Image and video processing › image forensics
image forgery detection
1.012026
EchoFence: Non-Intrusive Forgery Detection in Video Conferencing via Ultrasonic Sensing · INFOCOM 2026
Multimedia systems and quality of experience
video conferencing
1.012026
EchoFence: Non-Intrusive Forgery Detection in Video Conferencing via Ultrasonic Sensing · INFOCOM 2026
Internet of things and sensor networks
non-invasive sensing
1.012026
EchoFence: Non-Intrusive Forgery Detection in Video Conferencing via Ultrasonic Sensing · INFOCOM 2026
Wireless sensing and localization › acoustic sensing
ultrasonic sensing
1.012026
EchoFence: Non-Intrusive Forgery Detection in Video Conferencing via Ultrasonic Sensing · INFOCOM 2026
Privacy and data protection › information leakage
privacy leakage
1.012026
Fast or Secure? Push the Limit of Privacy Leakage Threat via Charging Side-Channel Attacks · WWW 2026
Ubiquitous computing and smart environments
device-free sensing
0.812024
One is Enough: Enabling One-shot Device-free Gesture Recognition with COTS WiFi · INFOCOM 2024
Wireless sensing and localization
wifi sensing
0.812024
One is Enough: Enabling One-shot Device-free Gesture Recognition with COTS WiFi · INFOCOM 2024
Wireless sensing and localization › human activity recognition
wireless gesture recognition
0.812024
One is Enough: Enabling One-shot Device-free Gesture Recognition with COTS WiFi · INFOCOM 2024
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack
electromagnetic side channel
0.812024
Privacy Leakage in Wireless Charging · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2024
Internet of things and sensor networks
wireless charging
0.212024
Privacy Leakage in Wireless Charging · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

ultrasonic sensing · 2.0theoretical modeling · 1.5meta-learning · 1.5few-shot learning · 1.5electromagnetic induction analysis · 1.5data augmentation · 1.5synthetic dataset training · 0.8deep neural network · 0.8context-aware demodulation · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 EchoFence: Non-Intrusive Forgery Detection in Video Conferencing via Ultrasonic Sensing
Leqi Zhao, Luxin Shi, Jianwei Liu 0008, Rui Xiao 0002, Jinsong Han
INFOCOM1
2026 Fast or Secure? Push the Limit of Privacy Leakage Threat via Charging Side-Channel Attacks
Xutong Zhang, Leqi Zhao, Kaiyan Cui, Ming Gao 0023, Jinsong Han, Fu Xiao 0001
WWW4
2024 One is Enough: Enabling One-shot Device-free Gesture Recognition with COTS WiFi
abstract
In recent years, WiFi-based gesture recognition (WGR) has gained popularity due to its privacy-preserving nature and the wide availability of WiFi infrastructure. However, existing WGR systems suffer from scalability issues, i.e., requiring extensive data collection and re-training for each new gesture class. To address these limitations, we propose OneSense, a one-shot WiFi-based gesture recognition system that can efficiently and easily adapt to new gesture classes. Specifically, we first propose a data enrichment approach based on the law of signal propagation in physical world to generate virtual gestures, enhancing the diversity of the training set without extra overhead of real sample collection. Then, we devise an aug-meta learning (AML) framework to enable efficient and scalable few-short learning. This framework leverages two pre-training stages (i.e., aug-training and meta-training) to improve the model’s feature extraction and generalization abilities, and ultimately achieves accurate one-shot gesture recognition through fine-tuning. Experimental results demonstrate that OneSense achieves 93% one-shot gesture recognition accuracy, which outperforms the state-of-the-art approaches. Moreover, it maintains high recognition accuracy when facing new environments, user locations, and user orientations. Furthermore, the proposed AML framework reduces 86%+ pre-training latency compared to conventional meta-learning method.
Leqi Zhao, Rui Xiao 0002, Jianwei Liu 0008, Jinsong Han
INFOCOM1
2024 Practical Optical Camera Communication Behind Unseen and Complex Backgrounds
abstract
Optical camera communication (OCC) holds potential for location-aware data transfer, facilitating applications such as localization and overlaying digital content for mixed reality experiences. However, existing OCC designs commonly require a clean background for reliable demodulation, rendering its use disruptive and impractical. To this end, we propose WinkLink, a novel OCC system capable of robust transmission behind complex backgrounds, even under low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) conditions. We address the key challenge of extracting subtle signals in the lossy OCC channel by designing a two-stage deep neural network and a context-aware demodulation protocol. The proposed system is trained solely on a synthesized dataset yet generalizes effectively to unseen real-world backgrounds. Through experiments in 12 diverse environments, we demonstrate that WinkLink successfully transmits OCC signals under a low SNR of -20 dB, achieving a substantial 5.8 dB SNR gain. This low SNR translates to an extended distance to 5.5× of baseline (11m with a 10W LED transmitter) and negligible interference on concurrent vision applications. Finally, WinkLink proves its efficacy even when the device is moving, i.e., dynamic backgrounds, making it ready for deployment on mobile devices.
Rui Xiao 0002, Leqi Zhao, Feng Qian 0006, Lei Yang 0061, Jinsong Han
MobiSys2
2024 Privacy Leakage in Wireless Charging
abstract
Wireless charging is becoming an essential power supply pattern for electronic devices. Currently, mainstream smartphones are almost compatible with wireless charging. However, when the charging efficiency is continuously improved, its security challenge still remains open yet overlooked. In this paper, we reveal that severe security flaws exist in the wireless charging procedure of off-the-shelf commodity smartphones. Specifically, we find that an attacker can utilize the electromagnetic induction effect between the wireless charger and the smartphone to detect the activities and operations performed on the smartphone. We term such attack asEM-Surfingside-channel attack and build a theoretical model to show its feasibility. To explore the hazard ofEM-Surfing, we propose a three-module attack method, with which we conduct real-world experiments over three mainstream models of smartphones. The results show that the attacker can achieve over 99%, 96%, 94%, and 97% accuracy when inferring the passcode, keystroke, App information, and speech content, respectively. We also design an App namedSecChargingto prevent smartphones fromEM-Surfingattacks. The defense experiment results demonstrate thatSecChargingcan mitigate the threats posed byEM-Surfingeffectively.
Jianwei Liu 0008, Leqi Zhao, Yusheng Tao, Sideng Hu, Jinsong Han, Kui Ren 0001
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.3