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Nicolas J. Forcade-Perkins

dblp:376/6039 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention
intrusion detection
0.812024
ProGen: Projection-Based Adversarial Attack Generation Against Network Intrusion Detection · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention › intrusion detection › attack detection › machine learning-based detection
machine learning-based intrusion detection
0.812024
ProGen: Projection-Based Adversarial Attack Generation Against Network Intrusion Detection · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

projection · 0.8generative adversarial network · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 ProGen: Projection-Based Adversarial Attack Generation Against Network Intrusion Detection
abstract
Adversarial attacks, widely recognized as significant threats to machine learning (ML) models in computer vision and natural language processing, can have more severe consequences when targeting ML-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). These attacks, characterized by data manipulation, necessitate a focused investigation grounded in the unique attributes of the data and practical constraints inherent to the target scenario, as opposed to indiscriminately applying methodologies borrowed from other domains. Since network traffic is complex unstructured data, ML models are commonly used in existing studies to explore how perturbations can defeat ML-based IDS. However, two challenges persist in the realm of traffic-space adversarial attack generation. First, raw traffic data cannot be directly input into ML models. Second, determining the appropriate perturbation scale and direction is challenging, particularly in the case of multi-class NIDS. In this work, we propose a projection-based adversarial attack generation framework, ProGen, to address these two challenges. ProGen is inspired by two observed characteristics of the NIDS scenario: flexible representation and clear objective. ProGen uses a basic feature sequence (BFS) space to represent network traffic in a way that aligns with realistic requirements. To achieve a clear objective, ProGen utilizes a traffic space generative adversarial network (GAN) to approximate distribution mapping between malicious traffic and benign traffic. To better apply the generative model for adversarial attacks, we further design constraints to preserve the functions of the adversarial traffic. We’ve successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of ProGen on six common ML models using the CSE-CIC-IDS2018, CIC-IDS-2017, and UNSW-NB15 datasets; however, we’re yet to validate these findings in real network environments. We visualize the generated distributions of the BFS elements to illustrate the projecting effect under the designed realistic constraints. The results of attack effectiveness tests show that attacks generated from ProGen can significantly reduce the detection performance across different ML models.
Minxiao Wang, Ning Yang 0009, Nicolas J. Forcade-Perkins, Ning Weng
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.3