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Koh Jun Hao

dblp:377/8502 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%
Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Trustworthy machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning › privacy attack
model inversion attack
1.522024
On the Vulnerability of Skip Connections to Model Inversion Attacks · ECCV (81) 2024
Model Inversion Robustness: Can Transfer Learning Help? · CVPR 2024
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › privacy
privacy-preserving machine learning
0.812024
Model Inversion Robustness: Can Transfer Learning Help? · CVPR 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning › privacy attack › model inversion attack
model inversion defense
0.812024
Model Inversion Robustness: Can Transfer Learning Help? · CVPR 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

transfer learning · 1.5model inversion attacks · 1.5fisher information · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Model Inversion Robustness: Can Transfer Learning Help?
abstract
Model Inversion (MI) attacks aim to reconstruct private training data by abusing access to machine learning models. Contemporary MI attacks have achieved impressive attack performance, posing serious threats to privacy. Meanwhile, all existing MI defense methods rely on regularization that is in direct conflict with the training objective, resulting in noticeable degradation in model utility. In this work, we take a different perspective, and propose a novel and simple Transfer Learning-based Defense against Model Inversion (TL-DMI) to render MI-robust models. Particularly, by leveraging TL, we limit the number of layers encoding sensitive information from private training dataset, thereby degrading the performance of MI attack. We conduct an analysis using Fisher Information to justify our method. Our defense is remarkably simple to implement. Without bells and whistles, we show in extensive experiments that TL-DMI achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) MI robustness. Our code, pre-trained models, demo and inverted data are available at: https://hosytuyen.github.io/projectsITL-DMI
Sy-Tuyen Ho, Koh Jun Hao, Keshigeyan Chandrasegaran, Ngoc-Bao Nguyen, Ngai-Man Cheung
CVPR2
2024 On the Vulnerability of Skip Connections to Model Inversion Attacks
Koh Jun Hao, Sy-Tuyen Ho, Ngoc-Bao Nguyen, Ngai-Man Cheung
ECCV (81)1