Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Carson Powers
dblp:377/9115
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
0as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0003-6643-8734ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 4 · 4 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
3 papers |
Systems and software security · 55% Cyber-physical and IoT security · 27% Usable security · 18% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Requirements engineering and software design · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cyber-physical and IoT security
medical device security |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | "There are rabbit holes I want to go down that I'm not allowed to go down": An Investigation of Security Expert Threat Modeling Practices for Medical Devices · USENIX Security Symposium 2024 |
Systems and software security
secure software development |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Using AI Assistants in Software Development: A Qualitative Study on Security Practices and Concerns · CCS 2024 |
Systems and software security › security engineering
threat modeling |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | "There are rabbit holes I want to go down that I'm not allowed to go down": An Investigation of Security Expert Threat Modeling Practices for Medical Devices · USENIX Security Symposium 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
qualitative study · 1.7interviews · 1.7threat modeling · 0.8semi-structured interviews · 0.8qualitative analysis · 0.8interview study · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | More Modalities, More Problems: Examining User Understanding of The Meta Quest Permissions FrameworkabstractCompared with preceding consumer technologies, virtual reality (VR) requires extensive collection of sensitive biometric data. On the Meta Quest 2 (the most popular consumer headset), application access to sensitive data is mediated by a permissions system adapted from Android’s model. In this work, we examine how VR’s immersive nature necessitates new permissions considerations beyond preceding technology and current VR devices. We analyze the Meta Quest 2’s permissions system, identifying where it diverges from Android's user-facing behavior surrounding biometric data. We then investigate the implications of both conventional Android and novel Quest permission flows through an in-person VR interview study with 23 participants. We observe that many participants lacked awareness of how VR collects data or the extent of passive tracking in VR. Based on these findings, we offer recommendations for VR permissions models and suggest directions for future work. Sarah Radway, Matthew Soto, Suvi Lama, Carson Powers, Daniel Votipka |
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol. | 4 |
| 2025 | "Threat modeling is very formal, it's very technical, and also very hard to do correctly": Investigating Threat Modeling Practices in Open-Source Software Projects
Harjot Kaur, Carson Powers, Ronald E. Thompson III, Sascha Fahl, Daniel Votipka |
USENIX Security Symposium | 2 |
| 2024 | Using AI Assistants in Software Development: A Qualitative Study on Security Practices and ConcernsabstractFollowing the recent release of AI assistants, such as OpenAI's ChatGPT and GitHub Copilot, the software industry quickly utilized these tools for software development tasks, e.g., generating code or consulting AI for advice. While recent research has demonstrated that AI-generated code can contain security issues, how software professionals balance AI assistant usage and security remains unclear. This paper investigates how software professionals use AI assistants in secure software development, what security implications and considerations arise, and what impact they foresee on secure software development. We conducted 27 semi-structured interviews with software professionals, including software engineers, team leads, and security testers. We also reviewed 190 relevant Reddit posts and comments to gain insights into the current discourse surrounding AI assistants for software development. Our analysis of the interviews and Reddit posts finds that despite many security and quality concerns, participants widely use AI assistants for security-critical tasks, e.g., code generation, threat modeling, and vulnerability detection. Their overall mistrust leads to checking AI suggestions in similar ways to human code, although they expect improvements and, therefore, a heavier use for security tasks in the future. We conclude with recommendations for software professionals to critically check AI suggestions, AI creators to improve suggestion security and capabilities for ethical security tasks, and academic researchers to consider general-purpose AI in software development. Jan H. Klemmer, Stefan Horstmann, Nikhil Patnaik, Cordelia Ludden, Cordell Burton Jr., Carson Powers, Fabio Massacci, Akond Ashfaque Ur Rahman, Daniel Votipka, Heather Lipford, Awais Rashid, Alena Naiakshina, Sascha Fahl |
CCS | 6 |
| 2024 | "There are rabbit holes I want to go down that I'm not allowed to go down": An Investigation of Security Expert Threat Modeling Practices for Medical Devices
Ronald E. Thompson III, Madeline McLaughlin, Carson Powers, Daniel Votipka |
USENIX Security Symposium | 3 |