Abstract In this paper, we explore the ‘interface’ between identity‐based public key cryptography (ID‐PKC) and mobilead hocnetworks (MANETs). In particular, we examine the problem of naming and namespace design in an identity‐based key infrastructure (IKI). We examine the potential impact that different types of identifiers may have on the utility ofad hocnetworks where an IKI provides the underlying key infrastructure. We also highlight a number of open problems inherent in extending namespaces to allow inter‐operability amongst heterogeneous trust domains. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Abstract In this paper, we examine issues of trust and reputation in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). We look at a number of the trust and reputation models that have been proposed, and we highlight open problems in this area. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

In this paper we present a new key-revocation scheme for ad hoc network environments with the following characteristics:

We present a secure e-commerce architecture that is resistant to client compromise and man-in-the-middle attacks on SSL. To this end, we propose several security protocols that use attestation techniques offered by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). Using these protocols, we can ensure that the client configuration remains untampered and trusted for the duration of the transaction. In addition, confidential data, such as authentication passwords, are only accessible by the electronic commerce server to which the users intend to transfer their data. Since we employ a trusted third party that is responsible for verifying a client's platform configuration, our approach does not depend on trusted computing at the server but instead only requires minor modification to server logic.

Summary form only given. The grid, a distributed computing paradigm, seeks to exploit the synergies of technology and social collaboration to solve data or computation-intensive problems. The risk to a user's data and results is dramatically increased when using workflows, because the entire dataset is exposed to the grid. The use of reputation and provenance information has been proposed to avoid selecting 'untrusted' nodes when provisioning grid jobs. However, this information may be unreliable or open to manipulation. We propose a scheme that uses trusted platforms that are compliant with the trusted computing group specifications. We make use of integrity measurement, sealing and platform attestation to provide the following security services to grid workflows: trusted resource provider selection, confidentiality of job information, integrity of job information, and audit data for process provenance.

In both the commercial and defence sectors a compelling need is emerging for the rapid, yet secure, dissemination of information across traditional organisational boundaries. In this paper we present a novel trust management paradigm for securing pan-organisational information flows that aims to address the threat of information leakage. Our trust management system is built around an economic model and a trust-based encryption primitive wherein: (i) entities purchase a key from a Trust Authority (TA) which is bound to a voluntarily reported trust score r, (ii) information flows are encrypted such that a flow tagged with a recipient trust score R can be decrypted by the recipient only if it possesses the key corresponding to a voluntarily reported score r < = R, (iii) the economic model (the price of keys) is set such that a dishonest entity wishing to maximise information leakage is incentivised to report an honest trust score r to the TA. This paper makes two important contributions. First, we quantify fundamental tradeoffs on information flow rate, information leakage rate and error in estimating recipient trust score R. Second, we present a suite of encryption schemes that realise our trust-based encryption primitive and identify computation and communication tradeoffs between them.

Recently, risk-based information trading has emerged as a new paradigm for securely sharing information across traditional organizational boundaries. In this paradigm, the risk of sharing information between organizations is characterized using expected losses (due, for example, to (un)intended information disclosure) and billed to a recipient. However, within risk-based information trading systems, quantifying the risks associated with sharing information is a non-trivial task, particularly when risk calculations depend on a number of factors. In this paper we introduce a data-centric metadata framework that extends risk-based information trading approaches by allowing one or more domains to exchange sensitive information based on metadata evaluated against internal risk assessments of the domains. We present a use case of our metadata framework using a coalition military scenario, wherein information flows can be controlled and regulated by our framework whilst allowing sufficiently high-quality tactical information to be disseminated.

In this paper, we demonstrate the application of trusted computing to securing peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. We identify a central challenge in providing many of the security services within these networks, namely the absence of stable verifiable peer identities. We employ the functionalities provided by trusted computing technology to establish a pseudonymous authentication scheme for peers and extend this scheme to build secure channels between peers for future communications. In support of our work, we illustrate how commands from the trusted computing group (TCG) specifications can be used to implement our approach in P2P networks.