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Pinji Chen

dblp:381/1608 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
5since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0000-2907-4677ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 5 · 2 first-author · 5 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
4 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 35% Network security · 28% Web and mobile security · 24%
Computer networks
2 papers
Network management and operations · 54% Internet architecture and protocols · 46%

Topics — the 9 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning
model stealing
1.822026
LLMThief: Evaluating Configuration Leaking Risks in Commercial LLM App Stores · SP 2026
More Simplicity for Trainers, More Opportunity for Attackers: Black-Box Attacks on Speaker Recognition Systems by Inferring Feature Extractor · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Network security › protocol security
protocol implementation vulnerability
1.012026
Identifying Logical Vulnerabilities in QUIC Implementations · NDSS 2026
Network security
QUIC
1.012026
Identifying Logical Vulnerabilities in QUIC Implementations · NDSS 2026
Web and mobile security › web attacks
cross-origin attacks
0.912025
Cross-Origin Web Attacks via HTTP/2 Server Push and Signed HTTP Exchange · NDSS 2025
Web and mobile security
web attacks
0.912025
Cross-Origin Web Attacks via HTTP/2 Server Push and Signed HTTP Exchange · NDSS 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
black-box attack
0.812024
More Simplicity for Trainers, More Opportunity for Attackers: Black-Box Attacks on Speaker Recognition Systems by Inferring Feature Extractor · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Network management and operations
protocol verification
0.312026
Identifying Logical Vulnerabilities in QUIC Implementations · NDSS 2026
Internet architecture and protocols › world wide web › web protocols
HTTP/2
0.312025
Cross-Origin Web Attacks via HTTP/2 Server Push and Signed HTTP Exchange · NDSS 2025
Natural language and speech › Speech recognition and synthesis
speaker recognition
0.212024
More Simplicity for Trainers, More Opportunity for Attackers: Black-Box Attacks on Speaker Recognition Systems by Inferring Feature Extractor · USENIX Security Symposium 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

logical vulnerability detection · 2.0feature extractor inference · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Identifying Logical Vulnerabilities in QUIC Implementations
Kaihua Wang, Jianjun Chen 0005, Pinji Chen, Jianwei Zhuge, Jiaju Bai, Hai-Xin Duan
NDSS3
2026 LLMThief: Evaluating Configuration Leaking Risks in Commercial LLM App Stores
Pinji Chen, Jinlong Jiang, Jianjun Chen 0005, Feiran Qin, Hai-Xin Duan, Kaiwen Shen
SP1
2025 The Danger of Packet Length Leakage: Off-path TCP/IP Hijacking Attacks Against Wireless and Mobile Networks
abstract
To combat eavesdropping and injection attacks, wireless networks widely adopt encryption to provide confidentiality and integrity guarantees. In this paper, we present a novel and generic attack, termed LenOracle, which can hijack the TCP/UDP connections over encrypted wireless networks (e.g., 5G/4G/3G and Wi-Fi) via packet injections from the Internet. Due to the design nature of wireless networks and stream ciphers they used, the length of IP packets being transmitted can be acquired by radio sniffing. It thus provides a side channel for adversaries. We found that adversaries could utilize this side channel with TCP features to infer the presence of a connection, infer the protocol state (sequence number, acknowledge number) of the connection, and finally hijack TCP/IP connections over wireless networks. Through real-world experiments in commercial LTE networks and real Wi-Fi networks, we demonstrated that the LenOracle attack is practical and severe against both TCP and UDP connections. For the former, we successfully injected a fake short message into a victim TCP connection; For the latter, we were able to inject a fake DNS response into a UDP connection and poisoned the DNS cache of the victim device. Following the responsible disclosure policy, we have reported our findings and mitigation recommendations to GSMA and Wi-Fi Alliance. The GSMA acknowledged that the issue affects 5G/4G/3G, notified all its members (operators and vendors worldwide) of this issue, and highlighted the mitigation we proposed.
Guancheng Li, Jianjun Chen 0005, Ge Dai, Pinji Chen, Huiming Liu, Hai-Xin Duan, Zhiyun Qian
EuroS&P5
2025 Cross-Origin Web Attacks via HTTP/2 Server Push and Signed HTTP Exchange
Pinji Chen, Jianjun Chen 0005, Mingming Zhang 0010, Qi Wang 0094, Yiming Zhang 0009, Hai-Xin Duan
NDSS1
2024 More Simplicity for Trainers, More Opportunity for Attackers: Black-Box Attacks on Speaker Recognition Systems by Inferring Feature Extractor
Yunjie Ge, Pinji Chen, Qian Wang 0002, Lingchen Zhao, Ningping Mou, Peipei Jiang 0002, Cong Wang 0001, Qi Li 0002, Chao Shen 0001
USENIX Security Symposium2