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Quanrui Rao

dblp:382/3666 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Deep learning architectures and training · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack
0.812024
Rethinking CNN's Generalization to Backdoor Attack from Frequency Domain · ICLR 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack
frequency-domain backdoor attack
0.812024
Rethinking CNN's Generalization to Backdoor Attack from Frequency Domain · ICLR 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack › trigger design
invisible trigger
0.812024
Rethinking CNN's Generalization to Backdoor Attack from Frequency Domain · ICLR 2024
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training
convolutional neural network
0.212024
Rethinking CNN's Generalization to Backdoor Attack from Frequency Domain · ICLR 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

trigger perturbation · 1.5frequency-domain analysis · 0.8frequency domain analysis · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Rethinking CNN's Generalization to Backdoor Attack from Frequency Domain
abstract
Convolutional neural network (CNN) is easily affected by backdoor injections, whose models perform normally on clean samples but produce specific outputs on poisoned ones. Most of the existing studies have focused on the effect of trigger feature changes of poisoned samples on model generalization in spatial domain. We focus on the mechanism of CNN memorize poisoned samples in frequency domain, and find that CNN generate generalization to poisoned samples by memorizing the frequency domain distribution of trigger changes. We also explore the influence of trigger perturbations in different frequency domain components on the generalization of poisoned models from visible and invisible backdoor attacks, and prove that high-frequency components are more susceptible to perturbations than low-frequency components. Based on the above fundings, we propose a universal invisible strategy for visible triggers, which can achieve trigger invisibility while maintaining raw attack performance. We also design a novel frequency domain backdoor attack method based on low-frequency semantic information, which can achieve 100\% attack accuracy on multiple models and multiple datasets, and can bypass multiple defenses.
Quanrui Rao, Wuying Liu
ICLR1