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Weihao Bai

dblp:385/6423 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 77% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 23%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems › zero-knowledge proofs › post-quantum zero-knowledge
lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs
0.812024
MPC-in-the-Head Framework without Repetition and its Applications to the Lattice-based Cryptography · SP 2024
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems › zero-knowledge proofs
MPC-in-the-head
0.812024
MPC-in-the-Head Framework without Repetition and its Applications to the Lattice-based Cryptography · SP 2024
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
post-quantum cryptography
0.812024
MPC-in-the-Head Framework without Repetition and its Applications to the Lattice-based Cryptography · SP 2024
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems
zero-knowledge proofs
0.812024
MPC-in-the-Head Framework without Repetition and its Applications to the Lattice-based Cryptography · SP 2024
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems › zero-knowledge proofs
non-interactive zero-knowledge argument
0.212024
MPC-in-the-Head Framework without Repetition and its Applications to the Lattice-based Cryptography · SP 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

NIZKAoK · 0.8MPC-in-the-head · 0.8LWE · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 MPC-in-the-Head Framework without Repetition and its Applications to the Lattice-based Cryptography
abstract
The MPC-in-the-Head framework has been proposed as a solution for Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments of Knowledge (NIZKAoK) due to its efficient proof generation. However, most existing NIZKAoK constructions using this approach require multiple MPC evaluations to achieve negligible soundness error, resulting in proof size and time that are asymptotically at least λ times the size of the circuit of the NP relation. In this paper, we propose a novel method to eliminate the need for repeated MPC evaluations, resulting in a NIZKAoK protocol for any NP relation that we call Diet. The proof size and time of Diet are asymptotically only polylogarithmic with respect to the size of the circuit C of the NP relation, but are independent of the security parameter λ. Hence, both the proof size and time can be significantly reduced.Moreover, Diet offers promising concrete efficiency for proving Learning With Errors (LWE) problems and its variants. Our solution provides significant advantages over other schemes in terms of both proof size and proof time, when considering both factors together. Specifically, Diet is a promising method for proving knowledge of secret keys for lattice-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) such as Frodo and Kyber, offering a practical solution to future post-quantum certificate management. For Kyber 512, our implementation achieves an online proof size of 83.65 kilobytes (KB) with a preprocessing overhead of 152.02KB. The implementation is highly efficient, with an online proof time of only 0.68 seconds and a preprocessing time of 0.81 seconds. Notably, our approach provides the first reported implementation of proving knowledge of secret keys for Kyber 512 using post-quantum primitives-based zero-knowledge proofs.
Weihao Bai, Qianwen Gao, Zhenfeng Zhang
SP1