Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Felix Reichmann
dblp:392/3006
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
4since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0005-0769-4046ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
4 papers |
Usable security · 68% Systems and software security · 22% Network security · 11% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Requirements engineering and software design · 50% Empirical software engineering · 50% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Empirical software engineering
developer studies |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | "It's not my responsibility to write them": An Empirical Study of Software Product Managers and Security Requirements · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 |
Requirements engineering and software design › non-functional requirements
security requirements |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | "It's not my responsibility to write them": An Empirical Study of Software Product Managers and Security Requirements · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 |
Usable security › security training
security awareness training |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Selling Satisfaction: A Qualitative Analysis of Cybersecurity Awareness Vendors' Promises · CCS 2024 |
Systems and software security
secure software development |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | "It's not my responsibility to write them": An Empirical Study of Software Product Managers and Security Requirements · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 |
Network security › secure communication › network-layer security
virtual private networks |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Security Knight in Shining Armor: What and Who VPN Providers Claim to Shield Consumers Against · CHI 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
interview study · 1.7content analysis · 0.9action research · 0.9web scraping · 0.8user study · 0.8thematic analysis · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Bridging the Gap Between Usable Security Research and Open-Source Practice - Lessons From a Long-Term Engagement With VeraCrypt
Felix Reichmann, Annalina Buckmann, Konstantin Fischer, M. Angela Sasse, Alena Naiakshina |
CHI | 1 |
| 2025 | Security Knight in Shining Armor: What and Who VPN Providers Claim to Shield Consumers Against
Felix Reichmann, Jens Christian Opdenbusch, Karola Marky, Marco Gutfleisch |
CHI | 1 |
| 2025 | "It's not my responsibility to write them": An Empirical Study of Software Product Managers and Security Requirements
Houda Naji, Felix Reichmann, Tobias Bruns, M. Angela Sasse, Alena Naiakshina |
USENIX Security Symposium | 2 |
| 2024 | Selling Satisfaction: A Qualitative Analysis of Cybersecurity Awareness Vendors' PromisesabstractSecurity awareness and training (SAT) vendors operate in a growing multi-billion dollar market. They publish various marketing promises on their websites to their customers -- organizations of all sizes. This paper investigates how these promises align with customers' needs, how they relate to human-centered security challenges highlighted in prior research, and what narrative is presented regarding the role of employees (as SAT recipients). We also investigate the level of transparency in vendor promises, as to whether it constitutes an information asymmetry. We gathered search terms from n=30 awareness professionals to perform an automated Google search and scraping of SAT vendors' websites. We then performed a thematic analysis of 2,476 statements on 156 websites from 59 vendors. We found that the messaging from SAT vendors precisely targets customers' need for easy-to-implement and compliance-fulfilling SAT products; how SAT products are offered also means that some of the impacts of SAT go unmentioned and are transferred to the customer, such as user support. In this vendor-customer relationship, employees are portrayed as a source of weaknesses, needing an indefinite amount of training to be incorporated into the organization's protection. We conclude with suggestions for SAT vendors and regulators, notably toward an SAT ecosystem that directly links SAT solutions to usable security technologies within the organization environment. Jonas Hielscher, Markus Schöps, Jens Christian Opdenbusch, Felix Reichmann, Marco Gutfleisch, Karola Marky, Simon Edward Parkin |
CCS | 4 |