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Felix Reichmann

dblp:392/3006 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
4since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0005-0769-4046ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
4 papers
Usable security · 68% Systems and software security · 22% Network security · 11%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Requirements engineering and software design · 50% Empirical software engineering · 50%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Empirical software engineering
developer studies
0.912025
"It's not my responsibility to write them": An Empirical Study of Software Product Managers and Security Requirements · USENIX Security Symposium 2025
Requirements engineering and software design › non-functional requirements
security requirements
0.912025
"It's not my responsibility to write them": An Empirical Study of Software Product Managers and Security Requirements · USENIX Security Symposium 2025
Usable security › security training
security awareness training
0.812024
Selling Satisfaction: A Qualitative Analysis of Cybersecurity Awareness Vendors' Promises · CCS 2024
Systems and software security
secure software development
0.312025
"It's not my responsibility to write them": An Empirical Study of Software Product Managers and Security Requirements · USENIX Security Symposium 2025
Network security › secure communication › network-layer security
virtual private networks
0.312025
Security Knight in Shining Armor: What and Who VPN Providers Claim to Shield Consumers Against · CHI 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

interview study · 1.7content analysis · 0.9action research · 0.9web scraping · 0.8user study · 0.8thematic analysis · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Bridging the Gap Between Usable Security Research and Open-Source Practice - Lessons From a Long-Term Engagement With VeraCrypt
Felix Reichmann, Annalina Buckmann, Konstantin Fischer, M. Angela Sasse, Alena Naiakshina
CHI1
2025 Security Knight in Shining Armor: What and Who VPN Providers Claim to Shield Consumers Against
Felix Reichmann, Jens Christian Opdenbusch, Karola Marky, Marco Gutfleisch
CHI1
2025 "It's not my responsibility to write them": An Empirical Study of Software Product Managers and Security Requirements
Houda Naji, Felix Reichmann, Tobias Bruns, M. Angela Sasse, Alena Naiakshina
USENIX Security Symposium2
2024 Selling Satisfaction: A Qualitative Analysis of Cybersecurity Awareness Vendors' Promises
abstract
Security awareness and training (SAT) vendors operate in a growing multi-billion dollar market. They publish various marketing promises on their websites to their customers -- organizations of all sizes. This paper investigates how these promises align with customers' needs, how they relate to human-centered security challenges highlighted in prior research, and what narrative is presented regarding the role of employees (as SAT recipients). We also investigate the level of transparency in vendor promises, as to whether it constitutes an information asymmetry. We gathered search terms from n=30 awareness professionals to perform an automated Google search and scraping of SAT vendors' websites. We then performed a thematic analysis of 2,476 statements on 156 websites from 59 vendors. We found that the messaging from SAT vendors precisely targets customers' need for easy-to-implement and compliance-fulfilling SAT products; how SAT products are offered also means that some of the impacts of SAT go unmentioned and are transferred to the customer, such as user support. In this vendor-customer relationship, employees are portrayed as a source of weaknesses, needing an indefinite amount of training to be incorporated into the organization's protection. We conclude with suggestions for SAT vendors and regulators, notably toward an SAT ecosystem that directly links SAT solutions to usable security technologies within the organization environment.
Jonas Hielscher, Markus Schöps, Jens Christian Opdenbusch, Felix Reichmann, Marco Gutfleisch, Karola Marky, Simon Edward Parkin
CCS4