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Maximilian Günther

dblp:392/9707 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Privacy and data protection · 77% Web and mobile security · 23%

Topics — the 1 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and mobile security
messaging application security
0.312026
Hey there! You are using WhatsApp: Enumerating Three Billion Accounts for Security and Privacy · NDSS 2026
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Hey there! You are using WhatsApp: Enumerating Three Billion Accounts for Security and Privacy
Gabriel K. Gegenhuber, Philipp É. Frenzel, Maximilian Günther, Johanna Ullrich, Aljosha Judmayer
NDSS3
2025 Careless Whisper: Exploiting Silent Delivery Receipts to Monitor Users on Mobile Instant Messengers
abstract
With over 3 billion users globally, mobile instant messaging apps have become indispensable for both personal and professional communication. Besides plain messaging, many services implement additional features such as delivery and read receipts informing a user when a message has successfully reached its target. This paper highlights that delivery receipts can pose significant privacy risks to users. We use specifically crafted messages that trigger silent delivery receipts allowing any user to be pinged without their knowledge or consent. By using this technique at high frequency, we demonstrate how an attacker could extract private information such as following a user across different companion devices, inferring their daily schedule, or deducing current activities. Moreover, we can infer the number of currently active user sessions (i.e., main and companion devices) and their operating system, as well as launch resource exhaustion attacks, such as draining a user’s battery or data allowance, all without generating any notification on the target side. Due to the widespread adoption of vulnerable messengers (WhatsApp and Signal) and the fact that any user can be targeted simply by knowing their phone number, we argue for a design change to address this issue.
Gabriel K. Gegenhuber, Maximilian Günther, Aljosha Judmayer, Florian Holzbauer, Philipp É. Frenzel, Johanna Ullrich
RAID2