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Syeda Tasnim Fabiha

dblp:398/0217 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 50% Systems and software security · 50%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Software testing · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › vulnerability discovery › machine-learning-based vulnerability detection
deep learning-based vulnerability detection
0.912025
Are We Learning the Right Features? A Framework for Evaluating DL-Based Software Vulnerability Detection Solutions · ICSE 2025
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › smart contract security
vulnerability detection
0.912025
Are We Learning the Right Features? A Framework for Evaluating DL-Based Software Vulnerability Detection Solutions · ICSE 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

feature preserving perturbations · 1.7feature eliminating perturbations · 1.7empirical study · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Are We Learning the Right Features? A Framework for Evaluating DL-Based Software Vulnerability Detection Solutions
abstract
Recent research has revealed that the reported results of an emerging body of deep learning-based techniques for detecting software vulnerabilities are not reproducible, either across different datasets or on unseen samples. This paper aims to provide the foundation for properly evaluating the research in this domain. We do so by analyzing prior work and existing vulnerability datasets for the syntactic and semantic features of code that contribute to vulnerability, as well as features that falsely correlate with vulnerability. We provide a novel, uniform representation to capture both sets of features, and use this representation to detect the presence of both vulnerability and spurious features in code. To this end, we design two types of code perturbations: feature preserving perturbations (FPP) ensure that the vulnerability feature remains in a given code sample, while feature eliminating perturbations (FEP) eliminate the feature from the code sample. These perturbations aim to measure the influence of spurious and vulnerability features on the predictions of a given vulnerability detection solution. To evaluate how the two classes of perturbations influence predictions, we conducted a large-scale empirical study on five state-of-the-art DL-based vulnerability detectors. Our study shows that, for vulnerability features, only$\sim 2 \%$of FPPs yield the undesirable effect of a prediction changing among the five detectors on average. However, on average,$\sim 84 \%$of FEPs yield the undesirable effect of retaining the vulnerability predictions. For spurious features, we observed that FPPs yielded a drop in recall up to 29 % for graph-based detectors. We present the reasons underlying these results and suggest strategies for improving DNN-based vulnerability detectors. We provide our perturbation-based evaluation framework as a public resource to enable independent future evaluation of vulnerability detectors.
Satyaki Das, Syeda Tasnim Fabiha, Saad Shafiq, Nenad Medvidovic
ICSE2