Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Kay Friedrich
dblp:400/5220
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Software maintenance and evolution · 87% Empirical software engineering · 13% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Usable security · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Usable security
developer-centered security |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | "I'm Pretty Expert and I Still Screw It Up": Qualitative Insights into Experiences and Challenges of Designing and Implementing Cryptographic Library APIs · SP 2025 |
Software maintenance and evolution
software supply chain |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Attributing Open-Source Contributions is Critical but Difficult: A Systematic Analysis of GitHub Practices and Their Impact on Software Supply Chain Security · NDSS 2025 |
Software maintenance and evolution › software supply chain
software supply chain security |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Attributing Open-Source Contributions is Critical but Difficult: A Systematic Analysis of GitHub Practices and Their Impact on Software Supply Chain Security · NDSS 2025 |
Empirical software engineering
mining software repositories |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Attributing Open-Source Contributions is Critical but Difficult: A Systematic Analysis of GitHub Practices and Their Impact on Software Supply Chain Security · NDSS 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
thematic analysis · 0.9semi-structured interviews · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Attributing Open-Source Contributions is Critical but Difficult: A Systematic Analysis of GitHub Practices and Their Impact on Software Supply Chain Security
Jan-Ulrich Holtgrave, Kay Friedrich, Fabian Fischer 0009, Nicolas Huaman Groschopf, Niklas Busch, Jan H. Klemmer, Marcel Fourné, Oliver Wiese, Dominik Wermke, Sascha Fahl |
NDSS | 2 |
| 2025 | "I'm Pretty Expert and I Still Screw It Up": Qualitative Insights into Experiences and Challenges of Designing and Implementing Cryptographic Library APIsabstractCryptographic libraries are a vital security component of software systems, yet their misuse has caused several incidents. Prior work has established that misuse of cryptographic libraries is common, and developers struggle to use their APIs correctly. However, it is currently unknown how the design and implementation decisions that shape cryptographic library APIs are made. To investigate these decisions and associated challenges in the design and implementation process of cryptographic library APIs, we conducted 21 semi-structured interviews with experienced developers of cryptographic libraries and used thematic analysis to identify overarching topics and challenges they encountered. We find that design decisions span a spectrum of abstraction levels and are heavily influenced by cryptographic standards, other libraries, legacy code, and developers' intuitions. Developers are challenged by the optimal level of abstraction for cryptographic APIs to balance security, usability, and flexibility. They lack systematic knowledge on defining usability and achieving such balance. Consequently, developers rely on usability self-tests, personal experiences, and opinions. Based on our findings, we make detailed recommendations to tailor future research toward better empirically validated support of cryptographic library API design and implementation decisions. Further, we advocate for integrating research-based usability guidance into cryptographic standardization to foster community discussion early on and better support secure, usable, and flexible cryptographic library APIs. Juliane Schmüser, Philip Klostermeyer, Kay Friedrich, Sascha Fahl |
SP | 3 |