Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Hannes Weissteiner
dblp:400/5248
· DBLP profile ↗
8ranked-venue papers
2as first author
8since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0006-0129-4073ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 8 · 2 first-author · 8 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
4 papers |
Hardware security and side channels · 90% Systems and software security · 10% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers |
Memory systems · 61% Hardware reliability and fault tolerance · 31% Performance modeling and evaluation · 8% |
Topics — the 13 heaviest of 13, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments |
2.0 | 3 | 2025 | TEEcorrelate: An Information-Preserving Defense against Performance-Counter Attacks on TEEs · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 TDXploit: Novel Techniques for Single-Stepping and Cache Attacks on Intel TDX · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 CounterSEVeillance: Performance-Counter Attacks on AMD SEV-SNP · NDSS 2025 |
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack |
1.9 | 2 | 2026 | Continuous User Behavior Monitoring using DNS Cache Timing Attacks · NDSS 2026 CounterSEVeillance: Performance-Counter Attacks on AMD SEV-SNP · NDSS 2025 |
Hardware security and side channels › microarchitectural attacks
performance counter attacks |
1.7 | 2 | 2025 | TEEcorrelate: An Information-Preserving Defense against Performance-Counter Attacks on TEEs · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 CounterSEVeillance: Performance-Counter Attacks on AMD SEV-SNP · NDSS 2025 |
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack › cache side-channel attacks
cache timing attack |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Continuous User Behavior Monitoring using DNS Cache Timing Attacks · NDSS 2026 |
Systems and software security
user behavior monitoring |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Continuous User Behavior Monitoring using DNS Cache Timing Attacks · NDSS 2026 |
Memory systems
DRAM |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Memory Band-Aid: A Principled Rowhammer Defense-in-Depth · NDSS 2026 |
Hardware reliability and fault tolerance
memory reliability |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Memory Band-Aid: A Principled Rowhammer Defense-in-Depth · NDSS 2026 |
Memory systems › DRAM
rowhammer |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Memory Band-Aid: A Principled Rowhammer Defense-in-Depth · NDSS 2026 |
Hardware security and side channels › microarchitectural attacks
cache attacks |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | TDXploit: Novel Techniques for Single-Stepping and Cache Attacks on Intel TDX · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 |
Hardware security and side channels › trusted execution environments
Intel TDX |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | TDXploit: Novel Techniques for Single-Stepping and Cache Attacks on Intel TDX · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 |
Hardware security and side channels › fault attacks
single-stepping attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | TDXploit: Novel Techniques for Single-Stepping and Cache Attacks on Intel TDX · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 |
Hardware security and side channels › trusted execution environments
AMD SEV-SNP |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | CounterSEVeillance: Performance-Counter Attacks on AMD SEV-SNP · NDSS 2025 |
Performance modeling and evaluation › performance monitoring
hardware performance counters |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | TEEcorrelate: An Information-Preserving Defense against Performance-Counter Attacks on TEEs · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
information-preserving defense · 1.7DNS cache timing · 1.0defense mechanisms · 0.9defense mechanism · 0.9cache side channel · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | TELESCOPE: TDX Exploit Leaking Encrypted Data using Sibling Core Performance CountersabstractTrusted execution environments (TEEs) protect applications running inside of them from untrusted host systems. The host can not access or modify the memory of applications protected by a TEE. Intel TDX is a recently introduced TEE that allows for the execution of arbitrary code, including entire operating systems, inside a protected environment. Prior work has attacked AMD SEV-SNP, AMD's counterpart to Intel TDX, using performance counters, by leaking sensitive information through them, e.g., which branches are taken. Intel TDX is thought not to be affected by such attacks, as it disables performance counters when entering the protected guests (TDs) to mitigate these attacks. Fabian Rauscher, Hannes Weissteiner, Daniel Gruss |
AsiaCCS | 2 |
| 2026 | Memory Band-Aid: A Principled Rowhammer Defense-in-Depth
Carina Fiedler, Jonas Juffinger, Sudheendra Raghav Neela, Martin Heckel, Hannes Weissteiner, A. Giray Yaglikçi, Florian Adamsky, Daniel Gruss |
NDSS | 5 |
| 2026 | Continuous User Behavior Monitoring using DNS Cache Timing Attacks
Hannes Weissteiner, Roland Czerny, Simone Franza, Stefan Gast, Johanna Ullrich, Daniel Gruss |
NDSS | 1 |
| 2025 | The HMB Timing Side Channel: Exploiting the SSD's Host Memory Buffer
Jonas Juffinger, Hannes Weissteiner, Thomas Steinbauer, Daniel Gruss |
DIMVA (1) | 2 |
| 2025 | Epistemology of Rowhammer Attacks: Threats to Rowhammer Research Validity
Martin Heckel, Hannes Weissteiner, Florian Adamsky, Daniel Gruss |
ESORICS (3) | 2 |
| 2025 | CounterSEVeillance: Performance-Counter Attacks on AMD SEV-SNP
Stefan Gast, Hannes Weissteiner, Robin Leander Schröder, Daniel Gruss |
NDSS | 2 |
| 2025 | TDXploit: Novel Techniques for Single-Stepping and Cache Attacks on Intel TDX
Fabian Rauscher, Luca Wilke, Hannes Weissteiner, Thomas Eisenbarth 0001, Daniel Gruss |
USENIX Security Symposium | 3 |
| 2025 | TEEcorrelate: An Information-Preserving Defense against Performance-Counter Attacks on TEEs
Hannes Weissteiner, Fabian Rauscher, Robin Leander Schröder, Jonas Juffinger, Stefan Gast, Jan Wichelmann, Thomas Eisenbarth 0001, Daniel Gruss |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |