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Chin Hui Han

dblp:431/2718 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › zero-sum game
minimax game
1.012026
Security Games with Layered Defenses: Adaptive Adversaries and Gittins Indices · AAAI 2026
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
security games
1.012026
Security Games with Layered Defenses: Adaptive Adversaries and Gittins Indices · AAAI 2026
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
multi-armed bandit
0.312026
Security Games with Layered Defenses: Adaptive Adversaries and Gittins Indices · AAAI 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

gradient-based algorithm · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Security Games with Layered Defenses: Adaptive Adversaries and Gittins Indices
abstract
Real-world security applications (e.g., cybersecurity) often involve multiple attack paths, each with layers of defenses that an attacker needs to sequentially overcome before a successful attack on the entire system. Each defensive resource changes dynamically in efficacy as the attack unfolds. In this paper, we study the case where attackers are adaptive, potentially switching paths over time in response to these changes with the goal to minimize the expected time until a successful attack. We formalize this as a min-max game and give examples where adaptive attackers are more powerful than non-adaptive ones. We show that defenses that do not account for adaptivity can perform arbitrarily worse. A connection between the attacker's optimal strategy with the classical theory of multi-armed bandits and the Gittins index is made, yielding a simple gradient based algorithm to solve our proposed min-max game. Experiments on synthetic settings validate our approach.
Chun Kai Ling, Jakub Cerný, Chin Hui Han, Garud Iyengar, Christian Kroer
AAAI3