Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Philip Derrin
dblp:45/5675
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2009
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 4 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Program verification · 50% Operating systems · 50% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Program verification › system verification
kernel verification |
0.1 | 1 | 2009 | seL4: formal verification of an OS kernel · SOSP 2009 |
Operating systems › kernel › kernel design
microkernel |
0.1 | 1 | 2009 | seL4: formal verification of an OS kernel · SOSP 2009 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
machine-checked proof · 0.1functional correctness · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | Experience report: seL4: formally verifying a high-performance microkernelabstractWe report on our experience using Haskell as an executable specification language in the formal verification of the seL4 microkernel. The verification connects an abstract operational specification in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL to a C implementation of the microkernel. We describe how this project differs from other efforts, and examine the effect of using Haskell in a large-scale formal verification. The kernel comprises 8,700 lines of C code; the verification more than 150,000 lines of proof script. Gerwin Klein, Philip Derrin, Kevin Elphinstone |
ICFP | 2 |
| 2009 | seL4: formal verification of an OS kernelabstractComplete formal verification is the only known way to guarantee that a system is free of programming errors.We present our experience in performing the formal, machine-checked verification of the seL4 microkernel from an abstract specification down to its C implementation. We assume correctness of compiler, assembly code, and hardware, and we used a unique design approach that fuses formal and operating systems techniques. To our knowledge, this is the first formal proof of functional correctness of a complete, general-purpose operating-system kernel. Functional correctness means here that the implementation always strictly follows our high-level abstract specification of kernel behaviour. This encompasses traditional design and implementation safety properties such as the kernel will never crash, and it will never perform an unsafe operation. It also proves much more: we can predict precisely how the kernel will behave in every possible situation.seL4, a third-generation microkernel of L4 provenance, comprises 8,700 lines of C code and 600 lines of assembler. Its performance is comparable to other high-performance L4 kernels. Gerwin Klein, Kevin Elphinstone, Gernot Heiser, June Andronick, David A. Cock, Philip Derrin, Dhammika Elkaduwe, Kai Engelhardt, Rafal Kolanski, Michael Norrish, Thomas Sewell, Harvey Tuch, Simon Winwood |
SOSP | 6 |
| 2007 | Towards a Practical, Verified Kernel
Kevin Elphinstone, Gerwin Klein, Philip Derrin, Timothy Roscoe, Gernot Heiser |
HotOS | 3 |
| 2006 | Running the manual: an approach to high-assurance microkernel developmentabstractWe propose a development methodology for designing and prototyping high assurance microkernels, and describe our application of it. The methodology is based on rapid prototyping and iterative refinement of the microkernel in a functional programming language. The prototype provides a precise semi-formal model, which is also combined with a machine simulator to form a reference implementation capable of executing real user-level software, to obtain accurate feedback on the suitability of the kernel API during development phases. We extract from the prototype a machine-checkable formal specification in higher-order logic, which may be used to verify properties of the design, and also results in corrections to the design without the need for full verification. We found the approach leads to productive, highly iterative development where formal modelling, semi-formal design and prototyping, and end use all contribute to a more mature final design in a shorter period of time. Philip Derrin, Kevin Elphinstone, Gerwin Klein, David A. Cock, Manuel M. T. Chakravarty |
Haskell | 1 |