Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Daniel Woodraska
dblp:52/9588
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2012
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1Security and privacy · 1Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Software testing · 100% | |
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Logic in computer science · 100% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Software testing › non-functional testing
security testing |
0.1 | 1 | 2012 | Automated Security Test Generation with Formal Threat Models · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2012 |
Logic in computer science › concurrency theory
predicate/transition net |
0.1 | 1 | 2012 | Automated Security Test Generation with Formal Threat Models · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2012 |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › smart contract security
vulnerability detection |
0.0 | 1 | 2012 | Automated Security Test Generation with Formal Threat Models · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2012 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
model-implementation mapping · 0.4STRIDE · 0.4predicate/transition nets · 0.3predicate/transition net · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | Automated Security Test Generation with Formal Threat ModelsabstractSecurity attacks typically result from unintended behaviors or invalid inputs. Security testing is labor intensive because a real-world program usually has too many invalid inputs. It is highly desirable to automate or partially automate security-testing process. This paper presents an approach to automated generation of security tests by using formal threat models represented as Predicate/Transition nets. It generates all attack paths, i.e., security tests, from a threat model and converts them into executable test code according to the given Model-Implementation Mapping (MIM) specification. We have applied this approach to two real-world systems, Magento (a web-based shopping system being used by many online stores) and FileZilla Server (a popular FTP server implementation in C++). Threat models are built systematically by examining all potential STRIDE (spoofing identity, tampering with data, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, and elevation of privilege) threats to system functions. The security tests generated from these models have found multiple security risks in each system. The test code for most of the security tests can be generated and executed automatically. To further evaluate the vulnerability detection capability of the testing approach, the security tests have been applied to a number of security mutants where vulnerabilities are injected deliberately. The mutants are created according to the common vulnerabilities in C++ and web applications. Our experiments show that the security tests have killed the majority of the mutants. Dianxiang Xu, Manghui Tu, Michael Sanford, Lijo Thomas, Daniel Woodraska |
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. | 5 |
| 2011 | Security Analysis of FileZilla Server Using Threat Models
Michael Sanford, Daniel Woodraska, Dianxiang Xu |
SEKE | 2 |