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John Wilander

dblp:58/3633 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2011
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program analysis · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › memory safety › memory corruption defense
buffer overflow protection
0.012003
A Comparison of Publicly Available Tools for Dynamic Buffer Overflow Prevention · NDSS 2003
Systems and software security
memory safety
0.012003
A Comparison of Publicly Available Tools for Dynamic Buffer Overflow Prevention · NDSS 2003
Program analysis
dynamic analysis
0.012003
A Comparison of Publicly Available Tools for Dynamic Buffer Overflow Prevention · NDSS 2003

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

dynamic analysis · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2011 RIPE: runtime intrusion prevention evaluator
abstract
Despite the plethora of research done in code injection countermeasures, buffer overflows still plague modern software. In 2003, Wilander and Kamkar published a comparative evaluation on runtime buffer overflow prevention technologies using a testbed of 20 attack forms and demonstrated that the best prevention tool missed 50% of the attack forms. Since then, many new prevention tools have been presented using that testbed to show that they performed better, not missing any of the attack forms. At the same time though, there have been major developments in the ways of buffer overflow exploitation.
John Wilander, Nick Nikiforakis, Yves Younan, Mariam Kamkar, Wouter Joosen
ACSAC1
2003 A Comparison of Publicly Available Tools for Dynamic Buffer Overflow Prevention
John Wilander, Mariam Kamkar
NDSS1