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Joel Frank

dblp:64/5428 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
3as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 4 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 38% Usable security · 29% Digital forensics and information hiding · 29%
Computer graphics and multimedia
2 papers
Audio and music processing · 36% Image and video processing · 32% Multimedia analysis and retrieval · 32%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program verification · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Generative modeling · 100%

Topics — the 9 heaviest of 11, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Digital forensics and information hiding
synthetic media detection
0.812024
A Representative Study on Human Detection of Artificially Generated Media Across Countries · SP 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial example
0.512021
Dompteur: Taming Audio Adversarial Examples · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial example
audio adversarial example
0.512021
Dompteur: Taming Audio Adversarial Examples · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Machine learning › Generative modeling
generative adversarial network
0.412020
Leveraging Frequency Analysis for Deep Fake Image Recognition · ICML 2020
Multimedia analysis and retrieval
deepfake detection
0.412020
Leveraging Frequency Analysis for Deep Fake Image Recognition · ICML 2020
Image and video processing
image forensics
0.412020
Leveraging Frequency Analysis for Deep Fake Image Recognition · ICML 2020
Program verification › model checking
bounded model checking
0.412020
ETHBMC: A Bounded Model Checker for Smart Contracts · USENIX Security Symposium 2020
Program verification › code-level verification
smart contract verification
0.412020
ETHBMC: A Bounded Model Checker for Smart Contracts · USENIX Security Symposium 2020
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.112020
AURORA: Statistical Crash Analysis for Automated Root Cause Explanation · USENIX Security Symposium 2020

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

adversarial training · 1.0frequency analysis · 0.9discrete cosine transform · 0.9survey · 0.8regression analysis · 0.8statistical analysis · 0.4bounded model checking · 0.4
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 A Representative Study on Human Detection of Artificially Generated Media Across Countries
abstract
AI-generated media has become a threat to our digital society as we know it. Forgeries can be created automatically and on a large scale based on publicly available technologies. Recognizing this challenge, academics and practitioners have proposed a multitude of automatic detection strategies to detect such artificial media. However, in contrast to these technological advances, the human perception of generated media has not been thoroughly studied yet.In this paper, we aim to close this research gap. We conduct the first comprehensive survey on people’s ability to detect generated media, spanning three countries (USA, Germany, and China), with 3,002 participants covering audio, image, and text media. Our results indicate that state-of-the-art forgeries are almost indistinguishable from "real" media, with the majority of participants simply guessing when asked to rate them as human- or machine-generated. In addition, AI-generated media is rated as more likely to be human-generated across all media types and all countries. To further understand which factors influence people’s ability to detect AI-generated media, we include personal variables, chosen based on a literature review in the domains of deepfake and fake news research. In a regression analysis, we found that generalized trust, cognitive reflection, and self-reported familiarity with deepfakes significantly influence participants’ decisions across all media categories.
Joel Frank, Franziska Herbert, Jonas Ricker, Lea Schönherr, Thorsten Eisenhofer, Asja Fischer, Markus Dürmuth, Thorsten Holz
SP1
2021 Dompteur: Taming Audio Adversarial Examples
Thorsten Eisenhofer, Lea Schönherr, Joel Frank, Lars Speckemeier, Dorothea Kolossa, Thorsten Holz
USENIX Security Symposium3
2020 Leveraging Frequency Analysis for Deep Fake Image Recognition
abstract
Deep neural networks can generate images that are astonishingly realistic, so much so that it is often hard for humans to distinguish them from actual photos. These achievements have been largely made possible by Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). While deep fake images have been thoroughly investigated in the image domain{—}a classical approach from the area of image forensics{—}an analysis in the frequency domain has been missing so far. In this paper,we address this shortcoming and our results reveal that in frequency space, GAN-generated images exhibit severe artifacts that can be easily identified. We perform a comprehensive analysis, showing that these artifacts are consistent across different neural network architectures, data sets, and resolutions. In a further investigation, we demonstrate that these artifacts are caused by upsampling operations found in all current GAN architectures, indicating a structural and fundamental problem in the way images are generated via GANs. Based on this analysis, we demonstrate how the frequency representation can be used to identify deep fake images in an automated way, surpassing state-of-the-art methods.
Joel Frank, Thorsten Eisenhofer, Lea Schönherr, Asja Fischer, Dorothea Kolossa, Thorsten Holz
ICML1
2020 AURORA: Statistical Crash Analysis for Automated Root Cause Explanation
Tim Blazytko, Moritz Schloegel, Cornelius Aschermann, Ali Abbasi 0002, Joel Frank, Simon Wörner, Thorsten Holz
USENIX Security Symposium5
2020 ETHBMC: A Bounded Model Checker for Smart Contracts
Joel Frank, Cornelius Aschermann, Thorsten Holz
USENIX Security Symposium1