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Peerapong Dhangwatnotai

dblp:66/3475 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
4as first author
0since 2021 · last 2011
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Theory of computation · 4 · 4 first-authorArtificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
4 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 67% Mathematical optimization · 20% Approximation and online algorithms · 13%

Topics — the 13 heaviest of 13, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
mechanism design
0.442011
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011
Multi-keyword sponsored search · EC 2011
Revenue maximization with a single sample · EC 2010
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › algorithmic mechanism design
single-parameter agents
0.222011
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · FOCS 2008
Mathematical optimization
scheduling
0.122011
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · FOCS 2008
Approximation and online algorithms
approximation schemes
0.112011
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory › auction bidding
bidding language
0.112011
Multi-keyword sponsored search · EC 2011
Mathematical optimization › scheduling › completion time minimization
makespan minimization
0.112011
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011
Approximation and online algorithms › approximation schemes
polynomial-time approximation scheme
0.112011
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011
Mathematical optimization › scheduling › parallel machine scheduling
related machines
0.112011
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
sponsored search auction
0.112011
Multi-keyword sponsored search · EC 2011
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
truthful mechanism
0.112011
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
prior-independent auction
0.112010
Revenue maximization with a single sample · EC 2010
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
revenue maximization
0.112010
Revenue maximization with a single sample · EC 2010
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › truthful mechanism
truthful approximation mechanisms
0.112008
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · FOCS 2008

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

randomized rounding · 0.2monotone approximation · 0.1monotone PTAS · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2011 Multi-keyword sponsored search
abstract
We investigate search engines ’ mechanism for allocating impressions generated from different search terms. This mechanism is equivalent to running an independent GSP auction for each search term only when the number of search terms is small. In practice, the number of search terms is so large that an advertiser cannot possibly communicate to the search engine all the GSP auctions that he wishes to participate in. For example, a travel agency is interested in all search terms pertaining to flight, including “flight to boston”, “ticket to SFO”, “cheap airfare”, etc. Therefore, the search engine introduces broad match keywords as a bidding language that allows an advertiser to submit a bid for multiple GSP auctions at once. However, with broad match
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai
EC1
2011 Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
abstract
We present the first monotone randomized polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for minimizing the makespan of parallel related machines ($Q||C_{\max}$), the paradigmatic problem in single-parameter algorithmic mechanism design. This result immediately gives a polynomial-time, truthful (in expectation) mechanism whose approximation guarantee attains the best-possible one for all polynomial-time algorithms (assuming $P\neq NP$). Our algorithmic techniques are flexible and also yield a monotone deterministic quasi-PTAS for $Q||C_{\max}$ and a monotone randomized PTAS for max-min scheduling on related machines.
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi, Timothy Roughgarden
SIAM J. Comput.1
2010 Revenue maximization with a single sample
abstract
We design and analyze approximately revenue-maximizing auctions in general single-parameter settings. Bidders have publicly observable attributes, and we assume that the valuations of indistinguishable bidders are independent draws from a common distribution. Crucially, we assume all valuation distributions are a priori unknown to the seller. Despite this handicap, we show how to obtain approximately optimal expected revenue - nearly as large as what could be obtained if the distributions were known in advance - under quite general conditions.
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Timothy Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan
EC1
2008 Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
abstract
We present the first monotone randomized polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for minimizing the makespan of parallel related machines (Q||Cmax), the paradigmatic problem in single-parameter algorithmic mechanism design. This result immediately gives a polynomial-time, truthful (in expectation) mechanism whose approximation guarantee attains the best-possible one for all polynomial-time algorithms (assuming P not equal to NP). Our algorithmic techniques are flexible and also yield, among other results, a monotone deterministic quasi-PTAS for Q||Cmaxand a monotone randomized PTAS for max-min scheduling on related machines.
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi, Timothy Roughgarden
FOCS1