Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai
dblp:66/3475
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
4as first author
0since 2021 · last 2011
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Theory of computation · 4 · 4 first-authorArtificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
4 papers |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 67% Mathematical optimization · 20% Approximation and online algorithms · 13% |
Topics — the 13 heaviest of 13, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
mechanism design |
0.4 | 4 | 2011 | Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011 Multi-keyword sponsored search · EC 2011 Revenue maximization with a single sample · EC 2010 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › algorithmic mechanism design
single-parameter agents |
0.2 | 2 | 2011 | Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011 Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · FOCS 2008 |
Mathematical optimization
scheduling |
0.1 | 2 | 2011 | Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011 Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · FOCS 2008 |
Approximation and online algorithms
approximation schemes |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory › auction bidding
bidding language |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Multi-keyword sponsored search · EC 2011 |
Mathematical optimization › scheduling › completion time minimization
makespan minimization |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011 |
Approximation and online algorithms › approximation schemes
polynomial-time approximation scheme |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011 |
Mathematical optimization › scheduling › parallel machine scheduling
related machines |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
sponsored search auction |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Multi-keyword sponsored search · EC 2011 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
truthful mechanism |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · SIAM J. Comput. 2011 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
prior-independent auction |
0.1 | 1 | 2010 | Revenue maximization with a single sample · EC 2010 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
revenue maximization |
0.1 | 1 | 2010 | Revenue maximization with a single sample · EC 2010 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › truthful mechanism
truthful approximation mechanisms |
0.1 | 1 | 2008 | Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents · FOCS 2008 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
randomized rounding · 0.2monotone approximation · 0.1monotone PTAS · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | Multi-keyword sponsored searchabstractWe investigate search engines ’ mechanism for allocating impressions generated from different search terms. This mechanism is equivalent to running an independent GSP auction for each search term only when the number of search terms is small. In practice, the number of search terms is so large that an advertiser cannot possibly communicate to the search engine all the GSP auctions that he wishes to participate in. For example, a travel agency is interested in all search terms pertaining to flight, including “flight to boston”, “ticket to SFO”, “cheap airfare”, etc. Therefore, the search engine introduces broad match keywords as a bidding language that allows an advertiser to submit a bid for multiple GSP auctions at once. However, with broad match Peerapong Dhangwatnotai |
EC | 1 |
| 2011 | Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter AgentsabstractWe present the first monotone randomized polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for minimizing the makespan of parallel related machines ($Q||C_{\max}$), the paradigmatic problem in single-parameter algorithmic mechanism design. This result immediately gives a polynomial-time, truthful (in expectation) mechanism whose approximation guarantee attains the best-possible one for all polynomial-time algorithms (assuming $P\neq NP$). Our algorithmic techniques are flexible and also yield a monotone deterministic quasi-PTAS for $Q||C_{\max}$ and a monotone randomized PTAS for max-min scheduling on related machines. Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi, Timothy Roughgarden |
SIAM J. Comput. | 1 |
| 2010 | Revenue maximization with a single sampleabstractWe design and analyze approximately revenue-maximizing auctions in general single-parameter settings. Bidders have publicly observable attributes, and we assume that the valuations of indistinguishable bidders are independent draws from a common distribution. Crucially, we assume all valuation distributions are a priori unknown to the seller. Despite this handicap, we show how to obtain approximately optimal expected revenue - nearly as large as what could be obtained if the distributions were known in advance - under quite general conditions. Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Timothy Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan |
EC | 1 |
| 2008 | Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter AgentsabstractWe present the first monotone randomized polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for minimizing the makespan of parallel related machines (Q||Cmax), the paradigmatic problem in single-parameter algorithmic mechanism design. This result immediately gives a polynomial-time, truthful (in expectation) mechanism whose approximation guarantee attains the best-possible one for all polynomial-time algorithms (assuming P not equal to NP). Our algorithmic techniques are flexible and also yield, among other results, a monotone deterministic quasi-PTAS for Q||Cmaxand a monotone randomized PTAS for max-min scheduling on related machines. Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi, Timothy Roughgarden |
FOCS | 1 |