This paper aims to develop the insights into Bayesian truth serum (BTS) mechanism by postulating a sequence of seven natural conditions reminiscent of axioms in information theory. The condition that reduces a larger family of mechanisms to BTS is additivity, akin to the axiomatic development of entropy. The seven conditions identify BTS as the unique scoring rule for ranking respondents in situations in which respondents are asked to choose an alternative from a finite set and provide predictions of their peers' propensities to choose, for finite or infinite sets of respondents.

Class imbalance presents a major hurdle in the application of classification methods. A commonly taken approach is to learn ensembles of classifiers using rebalanced data. Examples include bootstrap averaging (bagging) combined with either undersampling or oversampling of the minority class examples. However, rebalancing methods entail asymmetric changes to the examples of different classes, which in turn can introduce their own biases. Furthermore, these methods often require specifying the performance measure of interest a priori, i.e., before learning. An alternative is to employ the threshold moving technique, which applies a threshold to the continuous output of a model, offering the possibility to adapt to a performance measure a posteriori , i.e., a plug-in method. Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to this combination of a bagging ensemble and threshold-moving. In this paper, we study this combination and demonstrate its competitiveness. Contrary to the other resampling methods, we preserve the natural class distribution of the data resulting in well-calibrated posterior probabilities. Additionally, we extend the proposed method to handle multiclass data. We validated our method on binary and multiclass benchmark data sets by using both, decision trees and neural networks as base classifiers. We perform analyses that provide insights into the proposed method.

Over the past several decades, economists, psychologists, and neuroscientists have conducted experiments in which a subject, human or animal, repeatedly chooses between alternative actions and is rewarded based on choice history. While individual choices are unpredictable, aggregate behavior typically follows Herrnstein's matching law: the average reward per choice is equal for all chosen alternatives. In general, matching behavior does not maximize the overall reward delivered to the subject, and therefore matching appears inconsistent with the principle of utility maximization. Here we show that matching can be made consistent with maximization by regarding the choices of a single subject as being made by a sequence of multiple selves-one for each instant of time. If each self is blind to the state of the world and discounts future rewards completely, then the resulting game has at least one Nash equilibrium that satisfies both Herrnstein's matching law and the unpredictability of individual choices. This equilibrium is, in general, Pareto suboptimal, and can be understood as a mutual defection of the multiple selves in an intertemporal prisoner's dilemma. The mathematical assumptions about the multiple selves should not be interpreted literally as psychological assumptions. Human and animals do remember past choices and care about future rewards. However, they may be unable to comprehend or take into account the relationship between past and future. This can be made more explicit when a mechanism that converges on the equilibrium, such as reinforcement learning, is considered. Using specific examples, we show that there exist behaviors that satisfy the matching law but are not Nash equilibria. We expect that these behaviors will not be observed experimentally in animals and humans. If this is the case, the Nash equilibrium formulation can be regarded as a refinement of Herrnstein's matching law.