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Ben Roberts

dblp:70/2430 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2013
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorSystems, architecture and hardware · 1Theory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 80% Algorithms and data structures · 20%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
0.212013
Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions · EC 2013
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
equilibrium analysis
0.212013
Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions · EC 2013
Algorithms and data structures › ranking
ranking algorithm
0.212013
Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions · EC 2013
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
sponsored search auction
0.212013
Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions · EC 2013
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › solution concepts in games › equilibrium concepts › nash equilibrium
symmetric nash equilibrium
0.212013
Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions · EC 2013

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

simulation · 0.2revenue-optimal auction analysis · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2013 Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions
abstract
In a sponsored search auction, decisions about how to rank ads impose tradeoffs between objectives such as revenue and welfare. In this paper, we examine how these tradeoffs should be made. We begin by arguing that the most natural solution concept to evaluate these tradeoffs is the lowest symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE). As part of this argument, we generalise the well known connection between the lowest SNE and the VCG outcome. We then propose a new ranking algorithm, loosely based on the revenue-optimal auction, that uses a reserve price to order the ads (not just to filter them) and give conditions under which it raises more revenue than simply applying that reserve price. Finally, we conduct extensive simulations examining the tradeoffs enabled by different ranking algorithms and show that our proposed algorithm enables superior operating points by a variety of metrics.
Ben Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian A. Kash, Peter B. Key
EC1
1989 High performance circuits for the i486TM processor
abstract
Three high-performance circuit blocks of the i486 processor are described: a large, on-chip cache; a 1* clock generator; and a high-speed, 32-b adder. In addition, a summary of the methodology used to design these circuits are given. The circuit used to regulate the clock duty cycle used a feedback technique to adjust timer delays, preventing clock overlap. The timer circuit uses current mirror transistors and capacitors to create a delay interval controlled by the reference voltages. The 1* clock circuit on the i486 processor eases board design requirements by eliminating the need for double frequency clocks with tight timing.>
Ben Roberts, Paul Madland
ICCD2