Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Ange Martinelli
dblp:71/9245
· DBLP profile ↗
6ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0001-6004-3884ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 6 · 3 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
3 papers |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 69% Hardware security and side channels · 18% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 13% |
Topics — the 13 heaviest of 13, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key exchange › group key agreement
continuous group key agreement |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Quarantined-TreeKEM: A Continuous Group Key Agreement for MLS, Secure in Presence of Inactive Users · CCS 2024 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key exchange
group key agreement |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Quarantined-TreeKEM: A Continuous Group Key Agreement for MLS, Secure in Presence of Inactive Users · CCS 2024 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure messaging › secure group messaging
messaging layer security |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Quarantined-TreeKEM: A Continuous Group Key Agreement for MLS, Secure in Presence of Inactive Users · CCS 2024 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure messaging |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Quarantined-TreeKEM: A Continuous Group Key Agreement for MLS, Secure in Presence of Inactive Users · CCS 2024 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key exchange › group key agreement › continuous group key agreement
TreeKEM |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Quarantined-TreeKEM: A Continuous Group Key Agreement for MLS, Secure in Presence of Inactive Users · CCS 2024 |
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack |
0.5 | 2 | 2019 | Unifying Leakage Models on a Rényi Day · CRYPTO (1) 2019 Protecting AES with Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme · CHES 2011 |
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack
leakage model |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Unifying Leakage Models on a Rényi Day · CRYPTO (1) 2019 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
rényi divergence |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Unifying Leakage Models on a Rényi Day · CRYPTO (1) 2019 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › block cipher
AES |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Protecting AES with Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme · CHES 2011 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptographic implementation
AES masking |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Protecting AES with Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme · CHES 2011 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
block cipher |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Protecting AES with Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme · CHES 2011 |
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack
masking countermeasure |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Protecting AES with Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme · CHES 2011 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secret sharing |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Protecting AES with Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme · CHES 2011 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
rényi divergence · 0.4shamir's secret sharing · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Spilling-Cascade: An Optimal PKE Combiner for KEM Hybridization
Céline Chevalier, Guirec Lebrun, Ange Martinelli |
ACNS (1) | 3 |
| 2025 | The Art of Bonsai: How Well-Shaped Trees Improve the Communication Cost of MLSabstractMessaging Layer Security (MLS) is a Secure Group Messaging protocol that uses for its handshake a binary tree – called a Ratchet Tree – in order to reach a logarithmic communication cost in the number of group members. This Ratchet Tree represents users as its leaves; therefore any change in the group membership results in adding or removing a leaf in the tree. MLS consequently implements what we call a tree evolution mechanism, consisting of a user add algorithm – determining where to insert a new leaf – and a tree expansion process – stating how to increase the size of the tree when no space is available for a new user. The tree evolution mechanism currently used by MLS is designed so that it naturally left-balances the Ratchet Tree. However, such a tree structure is often quite inefficient in terms of communication cost. Furthermore, one may wonder whether the binary Ratchet Tree has a degree optimized for the features of MLS.Therefore, we study in this paper how to improve the communication cost of the handshake in MLS – realized through an operation called a commit – by considering both the tree evolution mechanism and the tree degree used for the Ratchet Tree. To do so, we determine the tree structure that optimizes its communication cost and we propose algorithms for both the user add and the tree expansion processes, that allow to remain close to that optimal structure and thus to have a communication cost as close as possible to the optimum. We also find out the Ratchet Tree degree that is best suited to a given set of parameters induced by the encryption scheme used by MLS. This study shows that when using classical (i.e. pre-quantum) ciphersuites, a binary tree is indeed the most appropriate Ratchet Tree; nevertheless, with post-quantum algorithms, it generally becomes more interesting to use instead a ternary tree.Our improvements do not change the TreeKEM protocol and are easy to implement. With parameter sets corresponding to practical ciphersuites, they reduce TreeKEM’s communication cost by 5 to 10%. In particular, the gain of 10% appears in the post-quantum setting – when both an optimized tree evolution mechanism and a ternary tree are necessary –, which is precisely the context where any optimization of the protocol’s communication cost is welcome, due to the large bandwidth of PQ encrypted communication. Céline Chevalier, Guirec Lebrun, Ange Martinelli, Jérôme Plût |
EuroS&P | 3 |
| 2024 | Quarantined-TreeKEM: A Continuous Group Key Agreement for MLS, Secure in Presence of Inactive UsersabstractThe recently standardized secure group messaging protocol Messaging Layer Security (MLS) is designed to ensure asynchronous communications within large groups, with an almost-optimal communication cost and the same security level as point-to-point secure messaging protocols such as Signal. In particular, the core sub-protocol of MLS, a Continuous Group Key Agreement (CGKA) called TreeKEM, must generate a common group key that respects the fundamental security properties of post-compromise security and forward secrecy which mitigate the effects of user corruption over time Céline Chevalier, Guirec Lebrun, Ange Martinelli, Abdul Rahman Taleb |
CCS | 3 |
| 2019 | Unifying Leakage Models on a Rényi Day
Thomas Prest, Dahmun Goudarzi, Ange Martinelli, Alain Passelègue |
CRYPTO (1) | 3 |
| 2018 | Grafting Trees: A Fault Attack Against the SPHINCS Framework
Laurent Castelnovi, Ange Martinelli, Thomas Prest |
PQCrypto | 2 |
| 2011 | Protecting AES with Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme
Louis Goubin, Ange Martinelli |
CHES | 2 |