Abstract Batch verification is a method to verify multiple digital signatures at a batch in time less than total individual verification time. Batch verification for an identity‐based signature scheme (IBS) is attractive because a short public identity such as an e‐mail address can be used as a verification key. In this paper, we first review the recent IBS scheme proposed by Shim and its batch verifier to show that the batch verifier is vulnerable to a forgery attack. In order to resist to the attack, we propose a new efficient batch verifier for the IBS scheme. The proposed batch verifier can deal with arbitrary number of signatures as a batch. We prove formally that the proposed batch verifier is secure. Then, we analyze the computation cost of the proposed batch verifier using concrete parameters and compare it with well‐known batch verifiers. The comparison shows that our batch verifier can significantly outperform the existing batch verifiers in computation. We finally present a one‐round three‐party identity‐based key agreement protocol as an application of our batch verifier, which requires only three pairing operations in verification. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

In this paper we address the issue of scalability in RFID pseudonym protocols. Many previously proposed protocols suffer from scalability issues because they require a linear search to identify or authenticate a tag. Some RFID protocols, however, only require constant time for tag identification, but, unfortunately, all previously proposed schemes of this type have serious shortcomings. We propose a novel RFID authentication protocol based on the Song-Mitchell protocol, that takesO(1) work to authenticate a tag, and meets the privacy, security and performance requirements identified here. The proposed scheme also supports tag delegation and ownership transfer in an efficient way.

In this paper, we investigate the possible privacy and security threats to RFID systems, and consider whether previously proposed RFID protocols address these threats. We then propose a new authentication protocol which provides the identified privacy and security features and is also efficient. The new protocol resists tag information leakage, tag location tracking, replay attacks, denial of service attacks, backward traceability, forward traceability (under an assumption), and server impersonation (also under an assumption). We also show that it requires less tag-side storage and computation than other similarly structured RFID protocols.