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Géza Tarnai

dblp:84/11024 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 1986
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Embedded and real-time systems · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Software testing · 100%
Computer networks
1 paper
Network management and operations · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Software testing
simulation-based testing
0.011986
Safety Verification for Train Traffic Control Communications · IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 1986
Embedded and real-time systems
cyber-physical system platforms
0.011986
Safety Verification for Train Traffic Control Communications · IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 1986
Embedded and real-time systems › critical systems
railway interlocking systems
0.011986
Safety Verification for Train Traffic Control Communications · IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 1986
Network management and operations › fault management
fault diagnosis
0.011986
Safety Verification for Train Traffic Control Communications · IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 1986

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

simulation · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1986 Safety Verification for Train Traffic Control Communications
abstract
Railway interlocking systems are the technical equipment of the operative train traffic control, regulating the routes and the speed of train units. Their basic task is to ensure the safety of the train traffic and shuntings, and to avoid dangerous situations. The safety provided by the interlocking system at normal operation and at breakdowns, namely the safety against dangers, must be proved by a so-called safety verification. This verification must prove that the failures which are considered possible do not cause fail/dangerous/system outputs. To verify the safety there are several procedures known, for example: simulation methods, various theoretical ways, practical tests, and their combinations. The simulation-based testing system RWS-3/Railway Simulator/has been developed by the Department of Transport Automation at the Technical University of Budapest for the Bulgarian State Railways for testing their computerized interlocking system.
Géza Tarnai
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun.1