Cloud-centric services are becoming the norm in modern IT and Operational Technology (OT) platforms, where cybersecurity risks are also on the rise. The evolving regulatory landscape within Europe, exemplified by the Network and Information Security 2 (NIS2) directive and the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), further amplifies the necessity for rigorous compliance measures. The presumption of conformity for platforms certified under EU-recognized certification schemes, as outlined by the CRA, is anticipated to promote the certification of IT and OT platforms. Nevertheless, the certification process for these platforms is challenging due to the complexity of cloud architectures and the constantly evolving threats, which require continuous adaptation. Furthermore, both NIS2 and CRA introduce new mandates, including the obligation to manage risks, report incidents to relevant authorities, inform customers about vulnerabilities, and provide relevant mitigation strategies. Consequently, there exists an urgent demand for tools and frameworks that support sustained certification in the cloudification of IT/OT platforms. This paper introduces the Continuous Certification Readiness Framework (CCRF), which is engineered to automate tasks related to certification preparation and support ongoing compliance assessments, thereby enabling organizations to effectively manage risks and uphold a high level of assurance within their cloud environments.

Keeping a vehicle secure implies provide of a long-term support, where over-the-air updates (OTA) play an essential role. Clear understanding of OTA threats is essential to counter them efficiently. Existing research on OTA threats often exclude human actors, such as drivers and maintenance personnel, as well as leave aside privacy threats. This paper addresses the gap by investigates security and privacy OTA threats relevant for vehicle manufacturers for the whole product lifecycle. We report on a practical scenario "long term support", its data flow elements, and outcomes of threat analyses. We apply state of the art approaches, such as STRIDE (extended with an automotive template) and LINDDUN, to an automotive case and consider an automotivespecific UNECE OTA threat catalogue. Outcomes indicate complementarity of these methods and provide inputs to studies how well they address practical automotive cases.