DDoS-for-hire services, also known as booters, have commoditized DDoS attacks and enabled abusive subscribers of these services to cheaply extort, harass and intimidate businesses and people by taking them offline. However, due to the underground nature of these booters, little is known about their underlying technical and business structure. In this paper, we empirically measure many facets of their technical and payment infrastructure. We also perform an analysis of leaked and scraped data from three major booters---Asylum Stresser, Lizard Stresser and VDO---which provides us with an in-depth view of their customers and victims. Finally, we conduct a large-scale payment intervention in collaboration with PayPal and evaluate its effectiveness as a deterrent to their operations. Based on our analysis, we show that these booters are responsible for hundreds of thousands of DDoS attacks and identify potentially promising methods to undermine these services by increasing their costs of operation.

Black hat search engine optimization (SEO), the practice of abusively manipulating search results, is an enticing method to acquire targeted user traffic. In turn, a range of interventions--from modifying search results to seizing domains--are used to combat this activity. In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of these interventions in the context of an understudied market niche, counterfeit luxury goods. Using eight months of empirical crawled data, we identify 52 distinct SEO campaigns, document how well they are able to place search results for sixteen luxury brands, how this capability impacts the dynamics of their order volumes and how well existing interventions undermine this business when employed.