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Ravi Bhoraskar

dblp:89/10956 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2014
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Systems and software security · 77% Web and mobile security · 23%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program verification · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › information flow control
information flow type system
0.212014
Collaborative Verification of Information Flow for a High-Assurance App Store · CCS 2014
Program verification › security property verification
information flow verification
0.212014
Collaborative Verification of Information Flow for a High-Assurance App Store · CCS 2014
Web and mobile security › mobile security
android security
0.112014
Brahmastra: Driving Apps to Test the Security of Third-Party Components · USENIX Security Symposium 2014
Web and mobile security › mobile application security
app store security
0.112014
Collaborative Verification of Information Flow for a High-Assurance App Store · CCS 2014

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

information-flow type system · 0.4declassification auditing · 0.4
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2014 Collaborative Verification of Information Flow for a High-Assurance App Store
abstract
Current app stores distribute some malware to unsuspecting users, even though the app approval process may be costly and time-consuming. High-integrity app stores must provide stronger guarantees that their apps are not malicious. We propose a verification model for use in such app stores to guarantee that the apps are free of malicious information flows. In our model, the software vendor and the app store auditor collaborate -- each does tasks that are easy for her/him, reducing overall verification cost. The software vendor provides a behavioral specification of information flow (at a finer granularity than used by current app stores) and source code annotated with information-flow type qualifiers. A flow-sensitive, context-sensitive information-flow type system checks the information flow type qualifiers in the source code and proves that only information flows in the specification can occur at run time. The app store auditor uses the vendor-provided source code to manually verify declassifications.
Michael D. Ernst, René Just, Suzanne Millstein, Werner Dietl, Stuart Pernsteiner, Franziska Roesner, Karl Koscher, Paulo Barros, Ravi Bhoraskar, Seungyeop Han, Paul Vines, Edward XueJun Wu
CCS9
2014 Brahmastra: Driving Apps to Test the Security of Third-Party Components
Ravi Bhoraskar, Seungyeop Han, Jinseong Jeon, Tanzirul Azim, Shuo Chen 0001, Jaeyeon Jung, Suman Nath, Rui Wang 0010, David Wetherall
USENIX Security Symposium1