Deterministic record-replay has many useful applications, ranging from fault tolerance and forensics to reproducing and diagnosing bugs. When choosing a record-replay solution, the system admin-istrator must choose a priori how comprehensively to record the execution and at what abstraction level to record it. Unfortunately, these choices may not match well with how the recording is eventu-ally used. A recording may contain too little information to support the end use of replay, or it may contain more sensitive information than is allowed to be shown to the end user of replay. Similarly, fixing the abstraction level at the time of recording often leads to a semantic mismatch with the end use of replay. This paper describes how to remedy these problems by adding customizable replay stages to create special-purpose logs for the end users of replay. Our system, called Crosscut, allows replay logs to be “sliced ” along time and abstraction boundaries. Using this approach, users can create slices that include only the processes, applications, or components of interest, excluding parts that handle sensitive data. Users can also retarget the abstraction level of the replay log to higher-level platforms, such as Perl or Valgrind. Exe-cution can then be augmented with additional analysis code at re-play time, without disturbing the replayed components in the slice. Crosscut thus uses replay itself to transform logs into a more effi-cient, secure, and usable form for replay-based applications. Our current Crosscut prototype builds on VMware Worksta-tion’s record-replay capabilities, and supports a variety of differ-ent replay environments. We show how Crosscut can create slices of only the parts of the computation of interest and thereby avoid leaking sensitive information, and we show how to retarget the ab-straction level of the log to enable more convenient use during re-play debugging.

We present a flexible architecture for trusted computing, called Terra, that allows applications with a wide range of security requirements to run simultaneously on commodity hardware. Applications on Terra enjoy the semantics of running on a separate, dedicated, tamper-resistant hardware platform, while retaining the ability to run side-by-side with normal applications on a general-purpose computing platform. Terra achieves this synthesis by use of a trusted virtual machine monitor (TVMM) that partitions a tamper-resistant hardware platform into multiple, isolated virtual machines (VM), providing the appearance of multiple boxes on a single, general-purpose platform. To each VM, the TVMM provides the semantics of either an "open box," i.e. a general-purpose hardware platform like today's PCs and workstations, or a "closed box," an opaque special-purpose platform that protects the privacy and integrity of its contents like today's game consoles and cellular phones. The software stack in each VM can be tailored from the hardware interface up to meet the security requirements of its application(s). The hardware and TVMM can act as a trusted party to allow closed-box VMs to cryptographically identify the software they run, i.e. what is in the box, to remote parties. We explore the strengths and limitations of this architecture by describing our prototype implementation and several applications that we developed for it.