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Lei Wei 0001

dblp:99/4916-1 · DBLP profile ↗
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8ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
0000-0001-8267-0283ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 7 · 2 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers
Software testing · 86% Programming languages and type systems · 8% Program analysis · 6%
Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Software testing
fuzzing
0.722019
Superion: grammar-aware greybox fuzzing · ICSE 2019
Skyfire: Data-Driven Seed Generation for Fuzzing · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2017
Systems and software security › vulnerability discovery
fuzzing
0.412019
Superion: grammar-aware greybox fuzzing · ICSE 2019
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.412019
Superion: grammar-aware greybox fuzzing · ICSE 2019
Software testing › fuzzing › input generation
generator-based fuzzing
0.312017
Skyfire: Data-Driven Seed Generation for Fuzzing · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2017
Software testing › fuzzing › input generation
seed generation
0.312017
Skyfire: Data-Driven Seed Generation for Fuzzing · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2017
Programming languages and type systems › language implementation
abstract syntax tree
0.112019
Superion: grammar-aware greybox fuzzing · ICSE 2019
Program analysis › model inference
grammar inference
0.112017
Skyfire: Data-Driven Seed Generation for Fuzzing · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2017

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

tree-based mutation · 0.8grammar-aware trimming · 0.8dictionary-based mutation · 0.8probabilistic context-sensitive grammar · 0.3AFL · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 Superion: grammar-aware greybox fuzzing
abstract
In recent years, coverage-based greybox fuzzing has proven itself to be one of the most effective techniques for finding security bugs in practice. Particularly, American Fuzzy Lop (AFL for short) is deemed to be a great success in fuzzing relatively simple test inputs. Unfortunately, when it meets structured test inputs such as XML and JavaScript, those grammar-blind trimming and mutation strategies in AFL hinder the effectiveness and efficiency. To this end, we propose a grammar-aware coverage-based greybox fuzzing approach to fuzz programs that process structured inputs. Given the grammar (which is often publicly available) of test inputs, we introduce a grammar-aware trimming strategy to trim test inputs at the tree level using the abstract syntax trees (ASTs) of parsed test inputs. Further, we introduce two grammar-aware mutation strategies (i.e., enhanced dictionary-based mutation and tree-based mutation). Specifically, tree-based mutation works via replacing subtrees using the ASTs of parsed test inputs. Equipped with grammar-awareness, our approach can carry the fuzzing exploration into width and depth. We implemented our approach as an extension to AFL, named Superion; and evaluated the effectiveness of Superion using large- scale programs (i.e., an XML engine libplist and three JavaScript engines WebKit, Jerryscript and ChakraCore). Our results have demonstrated that Superion can improve the code coverage (i.e., 16.7% and 8.8% in line and function coverage) and bug-finding capability (i.e., 34 new bugs, among which we discovered 22 new vulnerabilities with 19 CVEs assigned and 3.2K USD bug bounty rewards received) over AFL and jsfunfuzz.
Junjie Wang 0007, Bihuan Chen 0001, Lei Wei 0001, Yang Liu 0003
ICSE3
2017 Skyfire: Data-Driven Seed Generation for Fuzzing
abstract
Programs that take highly-structured files as inputs normally process inputs in stages: syntax parsing, semantic checking, and application execution. Deep bugs are often hidden in the application execution stage, and it is non-trivial to automatically generate test inputs to trigger them. Mutation-based fuzzing generates test inputs by modifying well-formed seed inputs randomly or heuristically. Most inputs are rejected at the early syntax parsing stage. Differently, generation-based fuzzing generates inputs from a specification (e.g., grammar). They can quickly carry the fuzzing beyond the syntax parsing stage. However, most inputs fail to pass the semantic checking (e.g., violating semantic rules), which restricts their capability of discovering deep bugs. In this paper, we propose a novel data-driven seed generation approach, named Skyfire, which leverages the knowledge in the vast amount of existing samples to generate well-distributed seed inputs for fuzzing programs that process highly-structured inputs. Skyfire takes as inputs a corpus and a grammar, and consists of two steps. The first step of Skyfire learns a probabilistic context-sensitive grammar (PCSG) to specify both syntax features and semantic rules, and then the second step leverages the learned PCSG to generate seed inputs. We fed the collected samples and the inputs generated by Skyfire as seeds of AFL to fuzz several open-source XSLT and XML engines (i.e., Sablotron, libxslt, and libxml2). The results have demonstrated that Skyfire can generate well-distributed inputs and thus significantly improve the code coverage (i.e., 20% for line coverage and 15% for function coverage on average) and the bug-finding capability of fuzzers. We also used the inputs generated by Skyfire to fuzz the closed-source JavaScript and rendering engine of Internet Explorer 11. Altogether, we discovered 19 new memory corruption bugs (among which there are 16 new vulnerabilities and received 33.5k USD bug bounty rewards) and 32 denial-of-service bugs.
Junjie Wang 0007, Bihuan Chen 0001, Lei Wei 0001, Yang Liu 0003
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy3
2012 On the (In)Security of IDEA in Various Hashing Modes
Lei Wei 0001, Thomas Peyrin, Przemyslaw Sokolowski, San Ling, Josef Pieprzyk, Huaxiong Wang
FSE1
2012 Unaligned Rebound Attack: Application to Keccak
Alexandre Duc, Jian Guo 0001, Thomas Peyrin, Lei Wei 0001
FSE4
2011 Improved Security Analysis of Fugue-256 (Poster)
Praveen Gauravaram, Lars R. Knudsen, Nasour Bagheri, Lei Wei 0001
ACISP4
2011 Improved Meet-in-the-Middle Cryptanalysis of KTANTAN (Poster)
Lei Wei 0001, Christian Rechberger, Jian Guo 0001, Hongjun Wu 0001, Huaxiong Wang, San Ling
ACISP1
2010 On Multidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis
Phuong Ha Nguyen, Lei Wei 0001, Huaxiong Wang, San Ling
ACISP2
2009 Extensions of the Cube Attack Based on Low Degree Annihilators
Aileen Zhang, Chu-Wee Lim, Khoongming Khoo, Lei Wei 0001, Josef Pieprzyk
CANS4