Many areas of artificial intelligence, and machine learning in particular, aim at being probably correct, i.e., valid on average, rather than pursuing the idealistic goal of being provably valid for all inputs. However, AI systems could still be predictably valid, such as an imperfect robot deliverer for which we can reliably and precisely predict the task instances for which it is correct and safe, its valid operating range. “Predictable AI” is a nascent research area that explores ways of anticipating key validity indicators (e.g., performance, safety) of present and future AI ecosystems. We argue that achieving predictability is crucial for fostering trust, liability, control, alignment and safety of AI, and thus should be prioritised over performance. We formally characterise predictability, explore its most relevant components, illustrate what can be predicted, describe alternative candidates for predictors, as well as the trade-offs between maximising validity and predictability. To illustrate these concepts, we bring an array of illustrative examples covering diverse ecosystem configurations. “Predictable AI” is related to other areas of technical and non-technical AI research, but have distinctive questions, hypotheses, techniques and challenges. This paper aims to elucidate them, calls for identifying paths towards a landscape of predictably valid AI systems and outlines the potential impact of this emergent field.

Even with obvious deficiencies, large prompt-commanded multimodal models are proving to be flexible cognitive tools representing an unprecedented generality. But the directness, diversity, and degree of user interaction create a distinctive “human-centred generality” (HCG), rather than a fully autonomous one. HCG implies that —for a specific user— a system is only as general as it is effective for the user’s relevant tasks and their prevalent ways of prompting. A human-centred evaluation of general-purpose AI systems therefore needs to reflect the personal nature of interaction, tasks and cognition. We argue that the best way to understand these systems is as highly-coupled cognitive extenders, and to analyse the bidirectional cognitive adaptations between them and humans. In this paper, we give a formulation of HCG, as well as a high-level overview of the elements and trade-offs involved in the prompting process. We end the paper by outlining some essential research questions and suggestions for improving evaluation practices, which we envision as characteristic for the evaluation of general artificial intelligence in the future.

Even with obvious deficiencies, large prompt-commanded multimodal models are proving to be flexible cognitive tools representing an unprecedented generality. But the directness, diversity, and degree of user interaction create a distinctive “human-centred generality” (HCG), rather than a fully autonomous one. HCG implies that —for a specific user— a system is only as general as it is effective for the user’s relevant tasks and their prevalent ways of prompting. A human-centred evaluation of general-purpose AI systems therefore needs to reflect the personal nature of interaction, tasks and cognition. We argue that the best way to understand these systems is as highly-coupled cognitive extenders, and to analyse the bidirectional cognitive adaptations between them and humans. In this paper, we give a formulation of HCG, as well as a high-level overview of the elements and trade-offs involved in the prompting process. We end the paper by outlining some essential research questions and suggestions for improving evaluation practices, which we envision as characteristic for the evaluation of general artificial intelligence in the future. This paper appears in the AI & Society track.

The new generation of language models is reported to solve some extraordinary tasks the models were never trained for specifically, in few-shot or zero-shot settings. However, these reports usually cherry-pick the tasks, use the best prompts, and unwrap or extract the solutions leniently even if they are followed by nonsensical text. In sum, they are specialised results for one domain, a particular way of using the models and interpreting the results. In this paper, we present a novel theoretical evaluation framework and a distinctive experimental study assessing language models as general-purpose systems when used directly by human prompters --- in the wild. For a useful and safe interaction in these increasingly more common conditions, we need to understand when the model fails because of a lack of capability or a misunderstanding of the user's intents. Our results indicate that language models such as GPT-3 have limited understanding of the human command; far from becoming general-purpose systems in the wild.

AI safety often analyses a risk or safety issue, such as interruptibility, under a particular AI paradigm, such as reinforcement learning.But what is an AI paradigm and how does it affect the understanding and implications of the safety issue?Is AI safety research covering the most representative paradigms and the right combinations of paradigms with safety issues?Will current research directions in AI safety be able to anticipate more capable and powerful systems yet to come?In this paper we analyse these questions, introducing a distinction between two types of paradigms in AI: artefacts and techniques.We then use experimental data of research and media documents from AI Topics, an official publication of the AAAI, to examine how safety research is distributed across artefacts and techniques.We observe that AI safety research is not sufficiently anticipatory, and is heavily weighted towards certain research paradigms.We identify a need for AI safety to be more explicit about the artefacts and techniques for which a particular issue may be applicable, in order to identify gaps and cover a broader range of issues.

The rhetoric of the race for strategic advantage is increasingly being used with regard to the development of artificial intelligence (AI), sometimes in a military context, but also more broadly. This rhetoric also reflects real shifts in strategy, as industry research groups compete for a limited pool of talented researchers, and nation states such as China announce ambitious goals for global leadership in AI. This paper assesses the potential risks of the AI race narrative and of an actual competitive race to develop AI, such as incentivising corner-cutting on safe-ty and governance, or increasing the risk of conflict. It explores the role of the research community in respond-ing to these risks. And it briefly explores alternative ways in which the rush to develop powerful AI could be framed so as instead to foster collaboration and respon-sible progress.

We present nine facets for the analysis of the past and future evolution of AI. Each facet has also a set of edges that can summarise different trends and contours in AI. With them, we first conduct a quantitative analysis using the information from two decades of AAAI/IJCAI conferences and around 50 years of documents from AI topics, an official database from the AAAI, illustrated by several plots. We then perform a qualitative analysis using the facets and edges, locating AI systems in the intelligence landscape and the discipline as a whole. This analytical framework provides a more structured and systematic way of looking at the shape and boundaries of AI.

Predicting the development of artificial intelligence (AI) is a difficult project – but a vital one, according to some analysts. AI predictions are already abound: but are they reliable? This paper starts by proposing a decomposition schema for classifying them. Then it constructs a variety of theoretical tools for analysing, judging and improving them. These tools are demonstrated by careful analysis of five famous AI predictions: the initial Dartmouth conference, Dreyfus's criticism of AI, Searle's Chinese room paper, Kurzweil's predictions in the Age of Spiritual Machines, and Omohundro's ‘AI drives’ paper. These case studies illustrate several important principles, such as the general overconfidence of experts, the superiority of models over expert judgement and the need for greater uncertainty in all types of predictions. The general reliability of expert judgement in AI timeline predictions is shown to be poor, a result that fits in with previous studies of expert competence.