Regulatory changes have enabled American student-athletes to profit from their name, image, and likeness (NIL). However, only a fraction of the student-athlete population is actually profiting from their NIL, which raises questions concerning fairness and inclusiveness. Motivated by that scenario, we look at technological solutions capable of sharing a limited amount of financial resources fairly and inclusively. Following a design science methodology, we define design requirements for such technological solutions after interviewing student-athletes, which leads us to establish the inclusive-meritocratic fairness criterion. Subsequently, we determine design principles that artifacts aiming at helping student-athletes should satisfy. We find that a solution that satisfies the proposed design principles is to associate student-athletes with digital collectibles represented as non-fungible tokens (NFTs). The core idea behind our artifact is that student-athletes receive royalties in primary markets after NFTs are randomly minted, plus deterministic royalties in secondary markets whenever a transaction involving their collectibles happens. Interviews with student-athletes validate our design. We conclude the paper by discussing how our ideas give rise to a new NIL design theory.

In today's digital age, characterized by rapid news consumption and increasing vulnerability to propaganda, fostering citizens' critical thinking is crucial for stable democracies. This paper introduces the design of ClarifAI, a novel automated propaganda detection tool designed to nudge readers towards more critical news consumption by activating the analytical mode of thinking, following Kahneman's dual-system theory of cognition. Using Large Language Models, ClarifAI detects propaganda in news articles and provides context-rich explanations, enhancing users' understanding and critical thinking. Our contribution is threefold: first, we propose the design of ClarifAI; second, in an online experiment, we demonstrate that this design effectively encourages news readers to engage in more critical reading; and third, we emphasize the value of explanations for fostering critical thinking. The study thus offers both a practical tool and useful design knowledge for mitigating propaganda in digital news.

Recent regulatory changes have enabled NCAA student-athletes to profit from their name, image, and likeness (NIL), departing from previous policies requiring those athletes to maintain their amateur status. However, despite the changes, it is unlikely that all the approximately 500,000 NCAA student-athletes will profit from NIL contracts. Within this context, we study how to design a fair and inclusive solution that may help all student-athletes secure NIL financial resources. Following a design science approach, we define design requirements after interviewing student-athletes. Subsequently, we derive three design principles: inclusiveness, fairness, and transparency. Thereafter, we suggest a blockchain-based artifact that satisfies all design principles. Our idea lies in designing collectibles as non-fungible tokens (NFTs) that pay different royalties whenever a transaction (purchase or exchange) happens in different markets (primary or secondary). Finally, we evaluate our solution by discussing its features with current student-athletes.

Inspired by an industry initiative to address the celebrated market for lemons (poor-quality used cars), we investigate how incentives for a permissioned blockchain-based system in the automobile ecosystem can be designed to ensure high-quality data storage and use by different stakeholders. The peer-to-peer distributed ledger platform connects organizations and car owners with disparate interests and hidden intentions. While previous literature has chiefly examined incentives for permissionless platforms, we leverage studies about crowdsensing applications to stimulate research on incentives in permissioned blockchains. This article uses the action design research approach to create an incentive system featuring a rating mechanism influenced by data correction measures. Furthermore, we propose relying on certain institutions capable of assessing data generated within the system. This combined approach of a decentralized data correction and an institutionalized data assessment is distinct from similar incentive systems suggested by literature. By using an agent-based model with strategy evolution, we evaluate the proposed incentive system. Our findings indicate that a rating-based revenue distribution leads to markedly higher data quality in the system. Additionally, the incentive system reveals hidden information of the agents and alleviates agency problems, contributing to an understanding of incentive design in inter-organizational blockchain-based data platforms. Furthermore, we explore incentive design in permissioned blockchains and discuss its latest implications.