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Zhongpu Wang

dblp:239/4846 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Reinforcement learning · 100%
Human-computer interaction and pervasive computing
1 paper
Human-AI interaction · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 100%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Cloud and datacenter computing · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
self-improving agent
1.012026
GUI0: Self-Evolving Foundational GUI Agents in Super App Ecosystems · ACL (1) 2026
Human-AI interaction
GUI agent
1.012026
GUI0: Self-Evolving Foundational GUI Agents in Super App Ecosystems · ACL (1) 2026
Hardware security and side channels › trusted execution environments
heterogeneous TEE
0.412020
Enabling Rack-scale Confidential Computing using Heterogeneous Trusted Execution Environment · SP 2020
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
0.412020
Enabling Rack-scale Confidential Computing using Heterogeneous Trusted Execution Environment · SP 2020
Cloud and datacenter computing › resource disaggregation
accelerator pooling
0.412020
Enabling Rack-scale Confidential Computing using Heterogeneous Trusted Execution Environment · SP 2020
Cloud and datacenter computing › cloud security
confidential computing
0.112020
Enabling Rack-scale Confidential Computing using Heterogeneous Trusted Execution Environment · SP 2020

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

self-evolution · 2.0GUI grounding · 2.0resource pooling · 0.9PCIe ExpressFabric · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 GUI0: Self-Evolving Foundational GUI Agents in Super App Ecosystems
abstract
Xinyi Wang, Wei Dai, Kyle Qiao, Ke Wang, Peng Chen, Gang Cao, Kangqin, Zhongpu Wang, Xiaode Zhang, Yanming Liu, Jihao Gu, Jingtao Xu, Gong Zhi. Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2026.
Kyle Qiao, Kang Qin, Zhongpu Wang, Xiaode Zhang, Jihao Gu, Jingtao Xu
ACL (1)8
2020 Enabling Rack-scale Confidential Computing using Heterogeneous Trusted Execution Environment
abstract
With its huge real-world demands, large-scale confidential computing still cannot be supported by today's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), due to the lack of scalable and effective protection of high-throughput accelerators like GPUs, FPGAs, and TPUs etc. Although attempts have been made recently to extend the CPU-like enclave to GPUs, these solutions require change to the CPU or GPU chips, may introduce new security risks due to the side-channel leaks in CPU-GPU communication and are still under the resource constraint of today's CPU TEE.To address these problems, we present the first Heterogeneous TEE design that can truly support large-scale compute or data intensive (CDI) computing, without any chip-level change. Our approach, called HETEE, is a device for centralized management of all computing units (e.g., GPUs and other accelerators) of a server rack. It is uniquely designed to work with today's data centres and clouds, leveraging modern resource pooling technologies to dynamically compartmentalize computing tasks, and enforce strong isolation and reduce TCB through hardware support. More specifically, HETEE utilizes the PCIe ExpressFabric to allocate its accelerators to the server node on the same rack for a non-sensitive CDI task, and move them back into a secure enclave in response to the demand for confidential computing. Our design runs a thin TCB stack for security management on a security controller (SC), while leaving a large set of software (e.g., AI runtime, GPU driver, etc.) to the integrated microservers that operate enclaves. An enclaves is physically isolated from others through hardware and verified by the SC at its inception. Its microserver and computing units are restored to a secure state upon termination.We implemented HETEE on a real hardware system, and evaluated it with popular neural network inference and training tasks. Our evaluations show that HETEE can easily support the CDI tasks on the real-world scale and incurred a maximal throughput overhead of 2.17% for inference and 0.95% for training on ResNet152.
Rui Hou 0001, XiaoFeng Wang 0001, Wenhao Wang 0001, Jiangfeng Cao, Boyan Zhao, Zhongpu Wang, Yuhui Zhang 0011, Jiameng Ying, Lixin Zhang 0002, Dan Meng 0002
SP7